Free Maine Abandoned Property Notice

Maine is one of the states that actually answers the question. 14 M.R.S. § 6013, captioned “Property unclaimed by tenant,” supplies a complete procedure — a storage standard, a notice, a claim window, an extension, a sale power, a proceeds waterfall and a waiver rule — and its opening sentence covers both endings at once: “Any personal property that remains in a rental unit after entry of judgment in favor of the landlord or that is abandoned or unclaimed by a tenant following the tenant’s vacating the rental unit must be disposed of as follows.” What trips readers up is not the existence of the rule but its arithmetic and its ending. Both periods run from the same event, and the money left over at the end does not go where almost everyone expects. Everything below comes from the section itself as published by the Maine Revisor of Statutes.

Fill in the fields below and the generator produces a dated notice of abandoned property you can print, sign, serve and keep a copy of. Nothing is stored and there is no charge. Fields you leave blank print as a dash so you can complete them by hand.

Watch: Free Maine Abandoned Property Notice — Fillable PDF explained

▶ Watch overview

The document this page generates is the written notice 14 M.R.S. § 6013(2) requires: notice of the landlord’s intent to dispose of the tenant’s property in accordance with subsection 5. Maine prescribes no form for it — no statutory paragraph, no posting on the door, no publication and no filing with any court or agency — but it does prescribe the delivery, the address and, on one of the two paragraphs, the contents. That is why a Maine-specific notice matters more here than in states where the notice is boilerplate. The form on this page asks which side of the statute’s own fault line you are on — paragraph (A), the tenant still in possession, addressed to the rental unit; or paragraph (B), the tenant who has vacated, addressed to the last known address and carrying the itemized list of the items and containers of items that only paragraph (B) requires — and prints the answer, the itemized list, the statement of intent to dispose under subsection 5 and the seven-day advisory into the notice itself. It also captures the one date the entire procedure turns on — the date the notice was sent — because the seven-day claim window and the fourteen-day storage extension both run from it, and because “proof of mailing” is a checkable thing the landlord has to be able to produce. Where the form invites a record the statute does not demand, it is evidence-keeping rather than compliance, and this page keeps the two apart.

• The full names of the landlord and of every tenant named on the tenancy, and the address of the rental unit with any unit number.
• Which paragraph the notice is being sent under — § 6013(2)(A) where the tenant is still in possession, or § 6013(2)(B) where the tenant has vacated — because the address and the contents differ.
• The address it is going to: the rental unit under paragraph (A), the last known address of the tenant under paragraph (B).
• A statement of the landlord’s intent to dispose of the property in accordance with subsection 5, which is the statutory description of what the notice is for.
• On a paragraph (B) notice, an itemized list of the items and containers of items — the statute’s own phrase, which contemplates listing a sealed box as a box rather than requiring every container to be opened and inventoried.
• On a paragraph (B) notice, the warning the statute requires: that if the tenant does not respond within 7 days the landlord may dispose of the property as set out in subsection 5.
• On a paragraph (A) notice, a claim period that is not shorter than the longer of seven days from the mailing or forty-eight hours after service of the writ of possession.
• The date the notice was sent, stated on its face — both statutory periods run from it.
• The proof of mailing, retained with the file, since first-class mail with proof of mailing is what the section requires on both paragraphs.
• Where the property is being stored, and confirmation that the location is safe, dry and secured.
• How the tenant may claim — and the notice should not require the claim in writing, because § 6013(5) contemplates an oral or written claim.
• A note of the date the seven-day window closes and the date the fourteenth day after the sending falls, so neither is miscalculated.
• Signature and date, with a copy of the notice, the itemized list and the proof of mailing kept together as the record that the procedure was followed.

• Adding the seven and the fourteen together. Both run from the sending of the notice. Fourteen days from the notice is the total where the tenant claims — not twenty-one.
• Sending it by certified mail. § 6013(2) requires first-class mail with proof of mailing on both paragraphs. Certified mail with return receipt is a different thing, and the section does not ask for it.
• Sending bare first-class mail. The other half of the same error. “With proof of mailing” is part of the requirement, and it is the part a landlord has to be able to produce afterwards.
• Leaving the itemized list off. Paragraph (B) requires “an itemized list of the items and containers of items” where the tenant has vacated. That is the notice most landlords will actually be sending.
• Sending the vacated-tenant notice to the rental unit. Paragraph (A) goes to the unit because the tenant is still there; paragraph (B) goes to the last known address.
• Paying the surplus to the tenant. § 6013(5)(D)(2) says “all remaining balances must be forwarded to the Treasurer of State.” Handing it back to the tenant is not what the section directs.
• Deducting something outside the closed list. Proceeds go to “rental arrearages, damages and costs of storage and sale.” Four categories, and the sentence does not invite a fifth.
• Charging a fee to release property claimed inside the window. § 6013(3) bars conditioning release on “any fee or any other amount that may be owed to the landlord by the tenant” — broader wording than paragraph 5(A)’s three cost categories.
• Relying on a lease lien clause. § 6030(2)(C) makes a provision requiring the tenant to give a lien on their property unenforceable and in violation of Title 5, section 207 — Maine’s unfair trade practices statute.
• Taking a waiver at lease signing. § 6013(6) allows a waiver only “after or upon vacating the rental unit.” A clause signed at the start of the tenancy is outside it and falls back into the general prohibition in § 6030(1).
• Treating an oral waiver as self-executing. “If this waiver is oral, the landlord shall confirm this waiver in writing.” The duty is on the landlord.
• Reading the disposal power as a shortcut. Disposal of property with “no reasonable fair market value” is available only for property that “remains unclaimed by the tenant in accordance with this subsection” — after the notice and after the window. It does not license skipping storage and notice for things that look worthless.
• Turning it into a dollar threshold. The test is no reasonable fair market value, a floor at zero — not property worth less than some amount, and not “low value.”
• Requiring the claim in writing. Paragraphs (A) and (C) of § 6013(5) both say “oral or written.”
• Citing § 6012. Maine’s old “Personal property” section was repealed in 2009. It still answers on the Revisor’s site as a live page, which is exactly why old summaries keep pointing at it. The live rule is § 6013.

Seven days from the sending of the notice for the tenant to claim it — and, if the tenant does claim it, storage must continue “at least 14 days after the landlord sent the notice.” That is fourteen days from the notice in total, not seven days followed by fourteen more.

14 M.R.S. § 6013 builds the whole procedure on a single anchor date, and once that is seen the arithmetic stops being confusing. § 6013(3) reads: “If the tenant claims the property within 7 days after the notice under subsection 2 is sent, the landlord shall release the property to the tenant and may not condition release of the property to the tenant upon payment of any fee or any other amount that may be owed to the landlord by the tenant.” § 6013(4) reads: “If the tenant responds to the notice sent pursuant to subsection 2, the landlord shall continue to store the property for at least 14 days after the landlord sent the notice.”

• Claim window: 7 days, running from the sending of the notice.
• Extended storage once claimed: at least 14 days, running from the sending of the notice — the same event, not from the claim.

So a tenant who telephones on day two has not bought themselves a fresh fortnight; the landlord’s duty runs to the fourteenth day after the notice went out, which leaves twelve. A tenant who claims on day seven has seven days left. And a landlord who believes Maine requires twenty-one days of storage is holding property a week longer than the statute asks.

The other half of the timing is the front end, and it goes the other way. Maine imposes no minimum storage period before the notice. § 6013(2) says notice “may be sent at any time after entry of judgment in favor of the landlord or after the tenant has vacated the rental unit.” A diligent landlord may therefore start the clock the same day, which means the practical floor on the walk-away track is seven days from a promptly sent notice. It is also why “Maine requires at least 14 days of storage” is only true where the tenant actually claims — stated flatly, it is wrong in the commonest case, which is the tenant who never responds at all.

“A safe, dry, secured location.” Three adjectives, all of them mandatory, and notably not “reasonable care.” § 6013(1) provides in full: “The landlord shall place in storage in a safe, dry, secured location any personal property that is abandoned or unclaimed by a tenant following the tenant’s vacating the rental unit.”

What the subsection does not do is equally worth stating, because it is where a page can easily invent obligations. It does not name a place. It does not require a commercial storage facility. It does not require the property to stay on the premises, and it does not prohibit that either. It imposes no insurance duty and sets no condition standard beyond the three adjectives. The obligation is expressed as a quality of the location, and a landlord who can show the location was safe, dry and secured has addressed what the statute asks.

The verb matters too. “Shall place in storage” is a duty, not an option, and it attaches at the point the property is abandoned or unclaimed — before any notice, before any clock. Leaving a departed tenant’s belongings on the kerb is not a Maine option; a landlord who does that is not inside § 6013 at all and is in the territory § 6014 governs.

No — and Maine says so in its opening sentence. One procedure covers both a walk-away and a court eviction. What differs is the notice paragraph, the address, and one writ-specific floor on the claim period.

The section opens: “Any personal property that remains in a rental unit after entry of judgment in favor of the landlord or that is abandoned or unclaimed by a tenant following the tenant’s vacating the rental unit must be disposed of as follows.” Both endings, one sentence, one set of consequences. The storage duty, the seven-day claim window, the fourteen-day extension, the release rules, the sale power and the surplus rule are identical on both tracks. There is no separate eviction-track disposal regime and no different liability standard.

The words “after entry of judgment in favor of the landlord” were added by a 2011 amendment. Before then the section’s reach was narrower, which is the reason a pre-2011 secondary source will describe Maine as though the eviction case were governed by something else.

Where the writ track genuinely differs. Two provisions do the work. First, § 6005 supplies the bridge that makes an evicted tenant’s goods abandoned as a matter of law: “When a writ of possession has been served on the defendant by a constable or sheriff, and the defendant fails to remove himself or his possessions within 48 hours of service by the constable or sheriff, the defendant is deemed a trespasser without right and the defendant’s goods and property are considered by law to be abandoned and subject to section 6013.” Read the anchor precisely: the forty-eight hours runs from service of the writ by the officer, not from the judgment and not from the officer physically removing the tenant. The same section supplies the step before it: “Seven calendar days after the judgment is entered, the court shall issue the writ of possession to remove the defendant.”

Second, § 6013(2)(A) carries a floor that is probably the most omitted sentence in the whole section. Where the tenant is still in possession, the landlord sends notice to the address of the rental unit, and then: “Notwithstanding subsections 3 and 5, the notice provided pursuant to this paragraph may not limit the time in which the tenant may claim the property to less than 7 days following the mailing of the notice or 48 hours after service of the writ of possession, whichever period is longer.”

Whichever period is longer. In practice that will usually be the seven days, because forty-eight hours from a writ service is a shorter span than a week from a mailing — but not always, and the section makes the comparison mandatory rather than leaving it to the landlord’s judgment. A notice under paragraph (A) that names a shorter window than the longer of the two has named a period the statute forbids.

Written notice by first-class mail with proof of mailing — expressly not certified mail — sent either to the rental unit or to the tenant’s last known address depending on whether the tenant is still in possession, and carrying an itemized list where the tenant has gone.

§ 6013(2) opens by telling the landlord when they may act: “Notice to the tenant by the landlord is governed by this subsection. Notice may be sent at any time after entry of judgment in favor of the landlord or after the tenant has vacated the rental unit.” It then splits into two paragraphs, and the split is substantive rather than cosmetic.

Paragraph (A) — the tenant is still in possession. The landlord “shall send written notice by first-class mail with proof of mailing to the tenant at the address of the rental unit of the landlord’s intent to dispose of, in accordance with subsection 5, any property remaining in the rental unit following the tenant’s vacating the rental unit,” subject to the “whichever period is longer” floor set out above. The address is the unit itself, because that is where the tenant still is.

Paragraph (B) — the tenant has vacated. The landlord “shall send written notice by first-class mail with proof of mailing to the last known address of the tenant concerning the landlord’s intent to dispose of the property stored pursuant to subsection 1. The notice must include an itemized list of the items and containers of items of the property and advise the tenant that if the tenant does not respond to the notice within 7 days the landlord may dispose of the property as set forth in subsection 5.”

Three details in that paragraph deserve to be pulled out because they are the ones a generic template will not have.

First, “proof of mailing” is a specific, checkable requirement and it sits on both paragraphs. It is not certified mail and it is not return receipt requested; nor is it satisfied by dropping an ordinary letter in a post box and remembering that you did. Upgrading it to certified mail on a form is as much a misstatement of Maine law as downgrading it.

Second, “items and containers of items” is drafted with care. The legislature expressly contemplated a sealed box being listed as a box. A landlord is not being told to open and inventory every container, but the container has to appear on the list. That is a genuinely useful distinction: it makes the itemized list achievable without turning it into a forensic exercise, and it means a list reading “four sealed cartons, one wardrobe box, one bicycle” is doing what the statute asks.

Third, only paragraph (B) requires the list and only paragraph (B) requires the seven-day warning. Paragraph (A) requires neither in those terms; what it requires instead is the claim-period floor. Sending the wrong paragraph’s notice is not a formatting slip — it means either omitting a required element or naming a period the statute constrains.

What the section does not require rounds it out: no statutory form is prescribed, no posting on the door, no publication, and no filing with any court or agency.

Yes — there is an express sale power. And the surplus goes to the Treasurer of State, not to the tenant. That is the single most inverted expectation on this topic.

§ 6013(5) is where the section pays off, and the paragraph order is itself the mechanism:

• (A) If the tenant makes an oral or written claim within seven days of the sending, the landlord “may not condition the release of the property to the tenant upon the tenant’s payment of any rental arrearages, damages and costs of storage as long as the tenant makes arrangements to retrieve the property by the 14th day after the notice … is sent.”
• (B) If the tenant claims as in (A) “but fails to retrieve the property by the 14th day,” the landlord may use the remedies in (D).
• (C) If the tenant “does not make an oral or written claim for the property within 7 days,” the landlord may use the remedies in (D).
• (D) For property that remains unclaimed in accordance with the subsection, the landlord may take one or more of: condition release on payment of all rental arrearages, damages and costs of storage; sell for a reasonable fair market price and forward all remaining balances to the Treasurer of State; or dispose of property that has no reasonable fair market value.

The sale rules, taken exactly as worded, are looser in one direction and stricter in another than readers expect. Looser: the price standard is “a reasonable fair market price” — there is no public-auction requirement, no advertising requirement, no notice-of-sale requirement and no competitive-bidding requirement anywhere in the section. Stricter: the proceeds may be applied to a closed list of four things — rental arrearages, damages, costs of storage, costs of sale — and then “all remaining balances must be forwarded to the Treasurer of State.”

Note also that (D)’s three remedies are expressly cumulative options, not a sequence: “one or more of the following actions.” A landlord may sell some items, dispose of others that are worthless, and hold the rest against arrearages, all under the same paragraph.

One divergence inside the section is flagged here and not resolved, because the record behind this page read no case law. Paragraph (A) protects the tenant “as long as the tenant makes arrangements to retrieve the property by the 14th day.” Paragraph (B) forfeits the protection where the tenant “fails to retrieve the property by the 14th day.” Makes arrangements to retrieve and retrieves are not the same act, and the two paragraphs use the two verbs three lines apart. Which controls is a real question and this page does not answer it.

There is no dollar threshold. There is a value-based disposal power, and it is written as a floor at zero: “dispose of any property that has no reasonable fair market value.”

§ 6013(5)(D)(3) is one line long and it means what it says. It is not a de minimis rule. It is not property worth less than some figure, and it is not “low value” property. The section contains no dollar figure at all — its only numerals are subsection numbers, the periods seven, fourteen and forty-eight, and the citation numbers in its amendment notes. Any page that translates this power into a dollar amount has supplied a number the legislature did not.

And it is not a shortcut past the procedure. Paragraph (D) is available only “with regard to any property that remains unclaimed by the tenant in accordance with this subsection” — that is, after the notice has gone out and either the seven-day window lapsed under paragraph (C) or the tenant claimed and missed the fourteenth day under paragraph (B). A landlord may not skip storage and notice for property that looks worthless. The judgment about value comes at the end of the process, not at the beginning.

Not during the claim window, and never by a lease clause — but yes once the window lapses. Maine’s leverage is a time-switch, not a lien. That distinction is the accurate frame, and it is worth setting out as a sequence because the answer genuinely changes with the date.

Before the notice, and for seven days after it is sent: no. § 6013(3) is the widest bar in the section — the landlord “may not condition release of the property to the tenant upon payment of any fee or any other amount that may be owed to the landlord by the tenant.” Note how much broader that is than the three cost categories named in paragraph 5(A). Subsection 3 catches anything owed.

Where the tenant claimed inside seven days and is retrieving by the fourteenth day: still no. § 6013(5)(A) bars conditioning release “upon the tenant’s payment of any rental arrearages, damages and costs of storage.”

Where the tenant never claimed, or claimed and missed the fourteenth day: yes. § 6013(5)(D)(1) expressly permits the landlord to “condition the release of the property to the tenant upon the tenant’s payment of all rental arrearages, damages and costs of storage.” The same three categories that were barred are now permitted. That symmetry is deliberate, and it is what makes this a switch thrown by the calendar rather than a security interest in the goods.

By a clause in the lease, at any time: no, and the consequence is unusually sharp. § 6030(2)(C) lists among provisions “specifically declared to be unenforceable and in violation of Title 5, section 207”: “Any provision that requires the tenant to give a lien upon the tenant’s property for the amount of any rent or other sums due the landlord.” Title 5, section 207 is Maine’s unfair trade practices statute, so a lease lien clause is not merely void — including it is characterised as an unfair trade practice.

Self-help holding is separately prohibited. § 6014(1)(C): “No landlord may willfully seize, hold or otherwise directly or indirectly deny a tenant access to and possession of the tenant’s property, other than by proper judicial process.” The same section provides that evictions effected “without resort to the provisions of this chapter” are “illegal and against public policy,” and that its remedies are “in addition to any other rights and remedies conferred by law.” The damages available under § 6014(2)(A) are a statutory minimum set by that paragraph, or actual damages, whichever is greater; this site does not print dollar figures outside its ordering pages, so read the amount at the section.

§ 6013 and § 6014 are not in conflict, and a page that presents them as a tension has misread the architecture. § 6013 is “the provisions of this chapter” for this purpose: it is the specific, later-amended procedure that supplies the lawful route § 6014 demands. A landlord who follows § 6013 is inside the safe harbour. A landlord who skips it is inside § 6014(1)(C).

And there is a cost-recovery route that does not involve holding anything at all, which is very likely missing from a thin page. § 6033(2) provides that reasons a landlord may retain the security deposit or part of it “include, but are not limited to, covering the costs of storing and disposing of unclaimed property, nonpayment of rent and nonpayment of utility charges that the tenant was required to pay directly to the landlord.” The storage and disposal costs come out of the deposit, expressly, with no lien on the goods needed. A related definitional edge sits in § 6031(1): “normal wear and tear” does not include “sums or labor expended by the landlord in removing from the rental unit articles abandoned by the tenant such as trash.” The deposit deadlines and their own consequences are a separate subject; our summary is at Maine security deposit laws.

Yes, but only at the right moment and only in the right way. § 6013 is the rare Maine tenant right that is expressly waivable — and the permission runs only “after or upon vacating the rental unit.” A waiver signed at lease signing is outside it.

§ 6013(6) is short and both of its paragraphs matter: “After or upon vacating the rental unit, a tenant may waive the tenant’s rights pursuant to this section. If this waiver is oral, the landlord shall confirm this waiver in writing.” And then: “A lease or tenancy at will agreement may permit a landlord to dispose of property abandoned by a tenant without liability as long as the landlord complies with the notice provisions of this section.”

Set that against the general rule it is an exception to. § 6030(1) makes it “an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of Title 5, section 207” for a landlord to require a tenant to enter a lease containing a provision that has the effect of “waiving a tenant right established in chapter 709, this chapter or chapter 710-A.” But the same subsection carries its own carve-out: “This subsection does not apply when the law specifically allows the tenant to waive a statutory right during negotiations with the landlord.”

The two dovetail exactly, and the seam is the answer. § 6013 sits in chapter 709, so a waiver of it would ordinarily be caught by § 6030(1). § 6030(1)’s carve-out is satisfied by § 6013(6), which specifically allows the waiver. But § 6013(6)’s permission is time-limited to “after or upon vacating,” so a waiver taken at the start of a tenancy does not reach the carve-out and falls back into § 6030(1). That is the difference between a lawful release and an unfair trade practice, and it is the obvious trap on this question.

Two further precision points. An oral waiver is valid, but “the landlord shall confirm this waiver in writing” — the confirmation duty is on the landlord, and the statute does not say the confirmation must be delivered, signed or countersigned. And the lease-clause paragraph is narrower than it first appears: it lets a lease relieve the landlord of liability for a disposal, “as long as the landlord complies with the notice provisions of this section.” It does not license skipping the notice. A lease clause purporting to authorise disposal without notice is outside the permission and back inside § 6030(1) and § 6014(1)(C).

These are measured negatives. All of 14 M.R.S. chapters 709, 710 and 710-A were read as a corpus — fifty-five sections and about twenty-four thousand words with the publisher’s own navigation subtracted — and the searches below ran across the whole of it, in a pass whose positive controls fired across all three chapters.

§ 6013 is the only abandoned-property procedure in the three chapters. § 6005 supplies the writ trigger and §§ 6030 and 6033 supply the waiver and cost-recovery edges, but the procedure itself is § 6013 alone. The words “proceeds” and “fair market value” each match § 6013 and nothing else.

§ 6012 is dead and is the citation trap for this topic. Maine’s former “Personal property” section was repealed in 2009 and its page still answers on the Revisor’s site, carrying the caption and the repeal note but none of the operative rules. Any description of Maine’s abandoned-property law sourced before 2009 is describing a repealed statute — and separately, the current § 6013 was itself repealed and replaced in 2009, so a pre-2009 source is wrong whichever of the two it relied on.

Commercial tenancies are not resolved, and this page states no rule for them. § 6013 sits in the residential subchapter. § 6017 opens “Notwithstanding the provisions of subchapter I, commercial landlords and tenants are governed by the following provisions” and was read in full: it contains no abandoned-property rule at all. So the text neither extends § 6013 to a commercial tenancy nor supplies a substitute. That is a gap in what the statutes say, and it is recorded here as one rather than filled in.

Animals are not addressed. Nothing read for this page establishes how Maine treats a pet or livestock left behind, and § 6013’s “personal property” is not construed here to cover a live animal. Mobile-home park tenancies were not searched either; Maine regulates those elsewhere.

How a surplus actually reaches the Treasurer of State is not described here. The destination is in the statute; the mechanics — the form, the deadline, any dormancy period, any reporting duty — sit in Maine’s unclaimed property act, which was not read for this page. Stating the destination is a finding; describing the remittance would be an invention.

And the negative this page will not draw. Where the text is silent, the text is silent — that is not the same as saying the landlord owes no duty. No Maine case law was read for this record, deliberately, so nothing here should be taken as stating what Maine’s courts have made of “reasonable fair market price,” of the fourteenth-day verbs, or of whether a § 6013 breach sounds in conversion alongside § 6014.

Everything above was read from 14 M.R.S. §§ 6005, 6012, 6013, 6014, 6017, 6030, 6031 and 6033 as published by the Maine Revisor of Statutes at legislature.maine.gov, the official electronic publisher, fetched directly rather than taken from any aggregator. No aggregator was fetched at all for this record, and no AI summary was used. It has not been verified against the printed Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, which controls in case of conflict.

A currency caveat that has to be stated rather than implied. The Revisor’s own site line reads that the text “reflects changes made through the First Special Session of the 132nd Maine Legislature, and is current through October 1, 2025,” and every section page carries a footer recording that its data was extracted on 20 October 2025. The reading behind this page was done in August 2026. That is roughly eleven months of drift, and anything enacted in the 2026 session would not be reflected in the text quoted here. It is a real gap, not a hedge, and anyone relying on this for a time-sensitive decision should check § 6013 against a current capture.

Against that, § 6013’s own printed history is reassuring on the narrower question of whether the section has moved recently: its last substantive amendment is a 2011 public law, together with a Revisor’s correction of the same year to the paragraph carrying the “whichever period is longer” floor. The section has not been amended since 2011 on this publisher’s text. The 2011 act is also what unified the two endings, split the notice into paragraphs (A) and (B) with the itemized-list requirement, rewrote the claim and storage subsections, and added the waiver subsection.

No court decision is used anywhere on this page, and several questions above are consequently left open rather than answered. That is a boundary, not a gap: this page states what the statute provides and does not state what the courts have made of it.

Related Maine summaries: Maine eviction notice laws, Maine security deposit laws and Maine landlord tenant laws. This page is general information about Maine statutes, not legal advice about a particular tenancy. Disposing of somebody else’s belongings is the kind of decision where being wrong is expensive in a way a form cannot fix, and an hour with a Maine attorney is worth more than any template.

Everything above turns on one question — what happens to the things a tenant leaves behind — and the answer is what it is because in Maine both clocks run from the day the notice is sent. The route the tenancy took decides which rule applies, so the notice that ended it and the money still in dispute are governed separately.

Maine eviction notice laws. Maine security deposit laws. Maine landlord tenant laws.

Published by Tenant Screening Background Check

Established 2004 · 20+ Years · All U.S. States & Territories · Statute-Based · Attorney-Reviewed

A Private Eye Reports™ service trusted by landlords, property managers, and attorneys.