Free Kentucky Notice to Enter

This Kentucky Notice to Enter gives a tenant clear written notice before the landlord enters the rental unit. Kentucky adopted URLTA locally, not statewide: in adopting jurisdictions, KRS §383.615 requires at least two days notice and entry at reasonable times; everywhere else entry is governed by the lease. See our tenant screening laws by state hub and how to screen tenants guide to keep your Kentucky tenancies documented from the start.

Complete the fields below to generate a Kentucky Notice to Enter. In jurisdictions that adopted URLTA, give at least two days notice and enter at reasonable times; outside those areas the lease governs, so give reasonable written notice – two days is a sound default. The form records the date, time window, purpose, the persons entering, and how the notice is delivered.

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Kentucky is a split state for landlord entry, and the split is the single most important thing to understand before relying on any rule. Kentucky adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), but – unlike most URLTA states – it did not make the Act apply statewide. Under KRS § 383.500, URLTA takes effect only in the counties and cities that locally adopt it in its entirety. Roughly nineteen jurisdictions have done so, among them Jefferson County (Louisville), Fayette County (Lexington), Oldham County, Pulaski County, and cities such as Covington, Newport, Florence, Georgetown, and Shelbyville, along with a cluster of smaller northern-Kentucky cities. With 120 counties and more than 400 cities in the state, the great majority of Kentucky is not covered. The first thing to confirm, every time, is whether your rental sits inside an adopting jurisdiction – because that single fact decides which body of law applies.

Outside the adopting jurisdictions Kentucky has no entry statute at all. There the lease is the controlling document, backed by the tenant’s common-law right to quiet enjoyment. Because the lease governs, give reasonable advance notice – two days is a sound default that mirrors the URLTA standard – and enter at reasonable times for a legitimate reason. Do not treat the two-day rule as a statewide Kentucky requirement; it is local. The geographic split also changes the remedies a tenant has when entry goes wrong, which is why the sections below treat the adopting jurisdictions and the rest of the state separately wherever the law actually diverges.

The legitimate reasons for entry are the same on both sides of the URLTA line, and in adopting jurisdictions they are spelled out in the statute. KRS § 383.615(1) frames access around a list of property-management functions: inspecting the premises, making necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements, supplying necessary or agreed services, and exhibiting the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors. The unifying test that the no-abuse clause implies is the same one good practice would suggest anywhere: the landlord must have a real, property-management reason to be inside the unit, not a pretext for checking up on or pressuring the tenant.

Repairs and maintenance are the most common reason a landlord needs access – responding to a repair request, performing scheduled upkeep, and addressing conditions the landlord is obligated to fix. A tenant who requests the work has invited the entry, which simplifies the timing; landlord-initiated work is where the two-day notice does its job in adopting jurisdictions. Inspections – annual condition checks, move-out walkthroughs, and pre-renewal assessments – are equally routine, and a clear notice describing the inspection keeps it from feeling intrusive.

Showings are a frequent flashpoint because they bring strangers into an occupied home. A landlord may need to show the unit to a prospective tenant near the end of a lease, to a prospective buyer if the property is on the market, or to a lender, appraiser, or contractor during a refinance or planned repair. Each is a legitimate purpose under KRS § 383.615(1), but each warrants generous notice of intent and reasonable scheduling. Building services and safety work round out the list: supplying agreed services, pest control treatment, servicing heating and cooling systems, and testing smoke and carbon-monoxide detectors, which most tenants welcome when scheduled with notice.

It is worth being explicit about what is not a legitimate purpose, because that is where the no-abuse clause of KRS § 383.615(3) bites in adopting jurisdictions and where a quiet-enjoyment claim arises everywhere else. Entering to check whether the tenant is keeping the unit “well enough” without any maintenance reason, to hunt for lease violations on a suspicion, to confront a tenant over a dispute, or simply to remind a tenant who is in control of the property are not property-management purposes; they are the pretextual entries a court will treat as an abuse of access. The discipline of writing the purpose on a notice is itself a useful filter: if a landlord cannot state a concrete, legitimate reason on paper, that is a strong signal the entry should not happen.

In an adopting jurisdiction the operative numbers are simple but real: at least two days’ notice of intent to enter, and entry only at reasonable times. Two days is a floor, not a target – count full days and do not shave the margin, because a notice delivered late in the day before an entry is hard to defend as “two days.” Outside URLTA areas there is no statutory figure at all, so the lease controls; but because reasonableness is what a court will measure under the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, the same two-day habit is the safest practice statewide. A landlord who always gives two days, URLTA or not, almost never gives a tenant a credible notice complaint.

On hours, “reasonable times” generally means normal daytime hours. Entry early in the morning, late at night, or on weekends is harder to defend as reasonable unless the tenant agrees or an emergency requires it. Matching the entry to the tenant’s schedule where practical, and offering a window rather than a single rigid time, both reinforce that the landlord is acting reasonably and within the access right the statute grants. A reasonable time on the calendar and a reasonable hour on the clock are two separate questions, and a careful landlord satisfies both.

Reasonableness also has a frequency dimension that the no-abuse and no-harass language of KRS § 383.615(3) makes explicit. A single, well-noticed entry to make a repair is plainly reasonable. A pattern of frequent entries, or repeated demands for entry, can cross into harassment and expose the landlord to the remedy in KRS § 383.700(2), because at some point the sheer volume of intrusions interferes with the tenant’s possession regardless of how politely each one is announced. The safe practice is to consolidate work, enter no more often than the task genuinely requires, and document each visit.

One more practical point about counting the two days deserves emphasis, because it is where careful landlords and careless ones part ways. The statute says “at least two (2) days,” which is a minimum and not a ceiling, and the cleanest way to honor it is to count two full calendar days between the day notice is delivered and the day of entry, rather than treating a notice handed over the afternoon before as if it bought two days. If the lease specifies how notice is counted, follow it; if it is silent, err generous, because a tenant who can show the notice arrived too late to prepare has a real grievance even where the landlord believed it was technically compliant. Building a standing two-business-day lead time into scheduling removes the argument entirely and costs the landlord nothing but a little planning.

How the notice is delivered feeds directly into whether it is reasonable. A notice the tenant never actually receives gives the landlord little protection, even if it was technically “sent.” Personal delivery to the tenant is the strongest method because it is hard to dispute. Posting on the door, especially when paired with an email or text, is a practical and widely used approach. Email or text alone is reasonable where the lease allows electronic notice and the tenant routinely uses that channel. Certified mail creates an excellent paper trail but is slow, so reserve it for situations where the schedule comfortably allows the full two days. Whatever the method, choose the channel most likely to reach this particular tenant, and keep proof that you used it.

The clearest situation in which a Kentucky landlord may enter without advance notice is a genuine emergency. In adopting jurisdictions KRS § 383.615(2) lets the landlord enter without the tenant’s consent in case of emergency, and subsection (3) excuses the two-day notice both for an emergency and where giving notice is impracticable. A fire, a flood, a gas leak, a burst pipe, or any other immediate threat to life, safety, or the property itself justifies immediate entry, because waiting to give notice could turn a containable problem into a catastrophe. Outside URLTA areas the same common-sense emergency principle applies as a matter of necessity under the lease.

It helps to draw a bright line between a true emergency and mere urgency. A burst pipe actively flooding the unit, a gas smell, a fire alarm, or a report of a medical crisis behind a locked door are emergencies that justify immediate entry, because every minute of delay risks serious harm. A lease violation the landlord is eager to confront, a repair the tenant has been slow to schedule, or a desire to get ahead of a deadline are urgent to the landlord but are not emergencies, and using the emergency label to cover them is exactly the overreach the no-abuse clause is meant to stop.

Because an emergency entry happens without the usual notice, documentation is the landlord’s protection. Record the date and time, the nature of the emergency, what was found on entering, what was done, and who entered, and keep any photographs. Notify the tenant promptly afterward, explaining what happened and why immediate entry was necessary. Scope matters too: an emergency justifies the entry needed to address the emergency, not a general search of the unit. A landlord who enters to stop a flood should deal with the water and leave, not take the opportunity to inspect the tenant’s belongings, because an emergency entry that balloons into a broader, unconnected search can lose its protection and revert to an ordinary unauthorized entry.

Showings deserve their own treatment because they put the landlord’s legitimate business needs in the sharpest tension with the tenant’s right to be left in peaceful possession. When a lease is ending, the landlord may reasonably need to show the unit to prospective tenants so it does not sit vacant. When the property is for sale, the landlord may need to show it to prospective buyers, and a buyer’s lender or appraiser may need access as well. KRS § 383.615(1) expressly lists exhibiting the unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors as a legitimate purpose – but every one of these brings outsiders into an occupied home.

The protection for both sides is reasonable notice of intent at a reasonable time, applied with extra care because showings cluster and involve strangers. In adopting jurisdictions that still means at least the two-day floor for each showing, and the no-abuse limit absolutely applies, so a flurry of poorly-noticed showings can itself become an abuse of access even if no single one fell below two days. A well-drafted Kentucky lease will often address how showings near the end of the term are handled, and a landlord should follow that clause while never falling below the statutory access standard where URLTA applies, or below ordinary reasonableness where it does not.

Practical courtesy goes a long way during a sale or re-rental. Group showings into defined windows rather than scattering them, give the tenant as much lead time as possible, and offer a way to reschedule around the tenant’s commitments. A tenant who feels respected during a marketing period is far less likely to refuse access or to claim harassment, and the landlord keeps the dated notices of intent that show every showing was properly announced and reasonably timed.

The entry rules assume the tenant is still in possession. When a tenant abandons the unit or surrenders it, the possessory interest that the notice rule protects begins to dissolve, and the landlord’s ability to enter changes – in adopting jurisdictions the access framework does not require the usual two-day notice where the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises. Abandonment, however, is a conclusion a landlord should reach carefully, because acting on a mistaken belief that a tenant has left can itself create liability.

Abandonment generally requires both that the tenant has actually left the premises and that the tenant intends not to return – shown by facts such as removed belongings, disconnected utilities, unpaid rent, and no response to contact. A tenant who is merely traveling, hospitalized, or temporarily away has not abandoned the unit, and treating an occupied home as abandoned can expose the landlord to a trespass claim and, in URLTA areas, to the abuse-of-access remedy in KRS § 383.700(2). Surrender is the cleaner case: the tenant affirmatively gives the unit back, by returning keys or by agreement, which ends the tenancy and the tenant’s possessory rights.

The safe approach is to confirm abandonment before relying on it. Document the indicators, attempt to reach the tenant, and, when the situation is genuinely ambiguous, use the legal process rather than self-help. Kentucky treats self-help harshly: KRS § 383.655 separately forbids unlawful ouster and the willful diminution of essential services and exposes a landlord to recovery of possession or termination plus up to three months’ periodic rent and attorney fees. Until the landlord is confident the tenant has surrendered or abandoned possession, the ordinary entry rules – two days’ notice at reasonable times in adopting areas, reasonable notice under the lease elsewhere, with emergencies excepted – continue to apply.

The lease shapes the day-to-day mechanics of access on both sides of the URLTA line, but its power differs. In an adopting jurisdiction the lease can give the tenant more notice than two days and can spell out how showings, inspections, and maintenance are coordinated, but it cannot contract below the statutory floor: a clause purporting to let the landlord enter on less than two days’ notice for ordinary entry, or to license entries that abuse access, does not override KRS § 383.615. Outside URLTA areas the lease is the controlling instrument and there is no statutory floor to clear, so its terms carry more weight – which is exactly why a tenant outside URLTA should read the entry clause closely before signing.

A tenant’s consent also matters in real time. Even where notice would otherwise be required, a tenant who agrees to a specific entry has invited it – a tenant-requested repair is the clearest example, needing no advance notice at all. The cleanest practice is to memorialize consent – a text or email confirming the date, time, and purpose – so that an agreed-upon visit cannot later be recast as an intrusion. Standing arrangements for routine access can be built into the lease, and one-off consent can be documented as it is given.

There is a limit that landlords in adopting jurisdictions should not lose sight of, and there it is statutory rather than merely prudential. The no-abuse clause of KRS § 383.615(3) means a landlord cannot use even a broadly worded lease as a shield for harassment. A landlord who relies on a permissive clause to enter repeatedly, at unreasonable hours, or to pressure a tenant is not merely exercising a contract right; that conduct can trigger the remedy in KRS § 383.700(2) – an injunction or termination plus actual damages and attorney fees – regardless of what the clause says. Outside URLTA areas the same conduct can breach the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. A permissive clause expands the landlord’s ordinary access; it does not license abuse.

For that reason, the smarter drafting choice is usually a clause that is clear rather than maximal. A clause that tracks the URLTA standard – reasonable notice of at least two days, entry at reasonable times, an emergency carve-out, and a stated delivery method – gives the landlord everything a normal operation needs while signaling good faith to a court, and it reads sensibly even in a county that has not adopted URLTA. An “any time, no notice” clause buys very little real-world freedom in an adopting jurisdiction, because the statutory duty and the no-abuse limit cap it anyway, and it reads badly if the tenancy ever turns adversarial.

This is the heart of Kentucky entry law and the part most often gotten wrong, for two reasons. First, the remedy depends on geography: in an adopting jurisdiction the tenant has statutory remedies, while outside one the tenant relies entirely on the common law. Second, even in an adopting jurisdiction the remedy is not in the access section, and not in the obvious-looking subsection. KRS § 383.615 states the duty; the dedicated remedy lives in a separate section, KRS § 383.700, and specifically in its subsection (2) – because subsection (1) is the landlord’s mirror-image remedy. The remedies below are presented roughly in the order a Kentucky tenant in possession would consider them.

KRS § 383.700(2) – the dedicated entry remedy (adopting jurisdictions)

This is the primary, purpose-built remedy where URLTA applies. KRS § 383.700(2) provides that if the landlord makes an unlawful entry, or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes repeated demands for entry that have the effect of unreasonably harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct or may terminate the rental agreement. In either case, the tenant may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The subsection reaches all three failure modes – the entry with no right, the entry made the wrong way, and the campaign of harassing demands – and gives the tenant a real choice between stopping the conduct and exiting the lease, with money damages and fees on top.

Why subsection (1) is the wrong hook for a tenant

The section heading – “Remedies for abuse of access” – is genuinely two-sided, and that is the trap. KRS § 383.700(1) runs the other direction: if the tenant refuses lawful access, the landlord may obtain injunctive relief to compel access or terminate, plus actual damages and attorney fees. A tenant claiming an abusive entry must cite subsection (2), not the bare section number and not subsection (1). Citing 383.700 without the subsection is ambiguous; citing 383.700(1) for a tenant’s claim is affirmatively wrong, because it invokes the landlord’s remedy against the tenant.

KRS § 383.655 – lockouts and loss of services

An over-entry on short notice and a lockout are different wrongs with different remedies. If the landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant, or willfully diminishes services by interrupting heat, running water, hot water, electric, gas, or another essential service, KRS § 383.655 lets the tenant recover possession or terminate the agreement and, in either case, recover up to three months’ periodic rent plus a reasonable attorney’s fee, with prepaid rent returned on termination. This is the statute for self-help eviction and utility shutoffs – serious conduct that goes beyond entering on too little notice, which is governed by KRS § 383.700(2).

KRS § 383.705 – retaliation

Retaliation is a separate protection that can also touch entry. KRS § 383.705 forbids a landlord from retaliating – by raising rent, cutting services, or bringing a possession action – after a protected tenant action such as a code-enforcement complaint, a complaint to the landlord about the condition of the premises, or joining a tenants’ organization, and it presumes retaliation for conduct within a year of the protected act. The statute routes the tenant’s relief through the KRS § 383.655 remedies. If a landlord weaponizes entry to retaliate, this bar can apply on top of the entry remedy, but it is a connected, distinct rule rather than the general entry remedy.

Common-law remedies (outside URLTA jurisdictions)

Where URLTA was never adopted, none of the statutory remedies above exist, and a tenant facing an abusive entry relies on the common law – which is why the geographic question matters so much. The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, read into every Kentucky lease, is breached when a landlord’s entries substantially interfere with the tenant’s beneficial use and enjoyment of the home. Common-law trespass reaches a landlord who enters a unit the tenant lawfully possesses without a right of access, because possession – not title – founds a trespass action, which is exactly why a tenant in possession can sue a landlord who holds title. And constructive eviction lets a tenant treat the lease as ended if the landlord’s conduct makes the home untenantable, but only if the tenant actually vacates within a reasonable time; a tenant who stays put cannot rely on it. These doctrines also remain available as supporting theories inside URLTA areas, but there the statutory KRS § 383.700(2) claim is the cleaner hook.

The practical lesson of this geographic divide is that a landlord should never assume the remedy landscape without first settling whether URLTA was adopted, because the same conduct produces very different exposure in each setting. Inside an adopting jurisdiction the tenant has a statute written for exactly this problem, with a defined menu of injunction, termination, actual damages, and attorney fees, and a clear path into court. Outside one, the tenant must build the claim on common-law doctrines that are more fact-intensive and, in the case of constructive eviction, demand the drastic step of moving out before the theory is even available. For the landlord, that asymmetry is not a reason to relax outside URLTA areas – a quiet-enjoyment or trespass judgment is still a judgment – but it does explain why the smartest single habit is to behave as though the two-day URLTA standard applied everywhere, which makes the geographic question almost irrelevant to day-to-day practice even though it remains decisive in litigation.

Almost every Kentucky entry dispute is preventable, and the prevention is mostly procedural rather than legal. The first habit is to confirm the jurisdiction once, at the start of the tenancy, and write the answer down: is the rental in a URLTA-adopting county or city or not? That single fact tells the landlord which rulebook applies and stops the most common Kentucky mistake – treating the two-day rule as statewide, or assuming it does not apply when in fact the city adopted URLTA years ago.

The second habit is to default to written notice for every non-emergency entry, even outside URLTA areas where the law would tolerate something looser, because a dated written notice is the single piece of evidence that converts a “he said, she said” argument into a documented, defensible record. Two days of written notice as a fixed routine, everywhere, costs the landlord almost nothing and forecloses the notice complaint entirely.

The third habit is restraint on frequency. In adopting jurisdictions the no-abuse and no-harass language of KRS § 383.615(3), backed by the remedy in KRS § 383.700(2), means the number of entries matters as much as the notice for any single one; outside URLTA, the same pattern can breach quiet enjoyment. Consolidate tasks into one visit where possible, avoid returning again and again for things that could have been handled together, and never use entry – or repeated demands for entry – to pressure a tenant who is in a dispute over rent, repairs, or renewal.

The fourth habit is record-keeping that outlives memory. Keep every signed notice of intent, every tenant request that waived notice, every consent text or email, and every emergency-entry log in the tenant’s file for the life of the tenancy. If a tenant ever asserts an abuse-of-access claim under KRS § 383.700(2), threatens a lockout claim under KRS § 383.655, or – outside URLTA – raises quiet enjoyment, that file is the landlord’s complete answer: it shows reasonable notice for ordinary entries, contemporaneous documentation for emergencies, and a frequency no reasonable factfinder would call harassment. This form exists to generate the centerpiece of that file – a clean, dated, signed notice of intent – for every entry a Kentucky landlord makes.

Kentucky entry law is unusually easy to get wrong because two things are true at once: the rules live inside the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Act itself applies only where a county or city has locally adopted it. So before any citation matters, the threshold question is geographic – is the rental in an adopting jurisdiction? If it is, the duty to give notice sits in KRS § 383.615 and the tenant’s remedy for an abusive entry sits in a different subsection of a different section, KRS § 383.700(2). The table below collects the authorities that actually govern entry in adopting jurisdictions, and the consequences of getting it wrong, so a landlord can see at a glance where each rule comes from and avoid the common error of citing the wrong section – or the wrong subsection – for the wrong purpose.

Read together, these authorities tell a coherent story that is easy to get wrong if you grab the first plausible-looking section. The very first move is geographic, because the rest of the table only exists in an adopting jurisdiction. Inside one, Kentucky did legislate entry, so the duty is statutory and concrete – the two-day notice, reasonable times, and the no-abuse command, all in KRS § 383.615. But the consequence for breaking that duty is not housed in the same section. It lives in KRS § 383.700, and even there only in subsection (2), because subsection (1) belongs to the landlord. A landlord who reads only 383.615 sees the obligation but misses the teeth; a reader who grabs 383.700(1) reaches for the wrong half of the right section.

A word on how to use this reference responsibly, because the entry area is unusually full of citation traps. The tenant’s remedy is § 383.700(2) – not 383.615, which is only the duty, and not 383.700(1), which is the landlord’s mirror-image remedy when a tenant refuses access. A lockout or utility shutoff is a different wrong handled by § 383.655, with its up-to-three-months’-rent damages, and retaliation is § 383.705. None of these statutory hooks exist outside an adopting jurisdiction; there the tenant falls back on quiet enjoyment, trespass, and constructive eviction. The right move for a Kentucky over-entry in an adopting area is § 383.700(2); the right move outside one is the common law. Any template that fills these gaps with the wrong section – or that prints the two-day rule as a statewide Kentucky requirement – is not making the page stronger; it is making it wrong.

None of this is a substitute for advice on a specific situation. The authorities here describe the general shape of Kentucky entry law, but the outcome of any actual dispute turns on whether the local government adopted URLTA, the exact lease language, the facts of the entries, and how a particular court reads them. The official statute text on the Kentucky Legislature portal is the best free starting point for both sides, and a qualified Kentucky landlord-tenant attorney is the right resource when a real conflict is on the table. Used alongside disciplined, well-documented notice, this form gives a Kentucky landlord a clean, defensible record for every entry – which is the most reliable protection the law actually allows, in URLTA jurisdictions and outside them alike.

A Kentucky Notice to Enter is the written notice a landlord or property manager gives a tenant before entering the rental unit. Kentucky is unusual: it adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), but the Act – and its two-day entry-notice rule in KRS §383.615 – applies only where a county or city has locally adopted it under KRS §383.500. Roughly nineteen jurisdictions have, including Jefferson County (Louisville), Fayette County (Lexington), Oldham County, Pulaski County, and cities such as Covington, Newport, Florence, Georgetown, and Shelbyville. Everywhere else in Kentucky there is no entry statute, and the lease plus the tenant’s common-law right to quiet enjoyment govern instead. So the first step is always geographic: confirm where the property sits, because that single fact decides which rules and which remedies apply.

Inside an adopting jurisdiction, KRS §383.615(3) controls: the landlord must give at least two days’ notice of intent to enter, may enter only at reasonable times for a legitimate purpose, and shall not abuse the right of access or use it to harass. The two-day notice is excused in a genuine emergency under §383.615(2), where notice is impracticable, or where the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the unit. Outside the adopting jurisdictions no statute sets a notice period, so the lease is the controlling document and the accepted default is reasonable advance notice – two days is a sound benchmark drawn from the URLTA standard. The legitimate purposes are the same on both sides: inspecting the unit, making necessary or agreed repairs, supplying services, and showing the unit to prospective purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, lenders, or contractors. This form lets you state the exact purpose, describe the work, list who will enter, and note whether the tenant’s presence is requested or required.

The risk a Kentucky landlord manages differs by location, and the citation is worth getting exactly right. In an adopting jurisdiction the tenant’s remedy for an abusive entry is KRS §383.700(2) – not §383.615, which is only the duty, and emphatically not §383.700(1), which is the landlord’s mirror-image remedy when a tenant refuses access. Under §383.700(2) an unlawful entry, a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or repeated harassing demands let the tenant obtain an injunction or terminate, plus actual damages and attorney fees. A lockout or utility shutoff is a different wrong under §383.655 (up to three months’ rent), and retaliation is barred by §383.705. Outside URLTA areas none of these statutes apply, and the tenant relies on quiet enjoyment, common-law trespass, and constructive eviction. In every case a dated, signed notice for each entry is the simple, durable record that shows you acted reasonably. Pair a consistent entry practice with disciplined tenant screening and a documented screening process so your Kentucky tenancies are well-run from application through move-out.

• Kentucky adopted URLTA locally under KRS §383.500, not statewide – confirm whether the property’s county or city adopted it.
• In adopting jurisdictions, KRS §383.615(3) requires at least two days’ notice of intent to enter and entry at reasonable times.
• The same subsection commands that the landlord shall not abuse the right of access or use it to harass.
• Outside adopting jurisdictions there is no entry statute; the lease and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment govern.
• A genuine emergency (KRS §383.615(2)), an impracticable situation, or tenant abandonment excuses the two-day notice.
• In adopting areas the tenant’s remedy for an abusive entry is KRS §383.700(2) – an injunction or termination plus actual damages and attorney fees.

• Personal delivery to the tenant.
• Posting on the door, alone or combined with email.
• Email or text where the lease permits electronic notice.
• Certified mail for a documented record when timing allows.

• Treating the two-day rule as statewide when it applies only in URLTA-adopting jurisdictions.
• Failing to check whether the property’s county or city actually adopted URLTA under KRS §383.500.
• Citing KRS §383.700 without the subsection, or citing §383.700(1) – the landlord’s remedy – for a tenant’s claim.
• Confusing an over-entry (KRS §383.700(2)) with a lockout or utility shutoff (KRS §383.655).
• Entering at unreasonable times or repeatedly, risking a §383.700(2) or quiet-enjoyment claim.
• Giving vague notice or keeping no dated copy that notice was provided.

• Confirm the jurisdiction first, then apply the two-day rule or the lease accordingly.
• Default to two days of written notice even outside URLTA areas, and even when a lease asks for less.
• State the exact purpose, time window, and persons entering, and offer a way to reschedule.
• Consolidate entries and avoid repeated demands that could read as harassment.
• Keep every signed notice on file for the life of the tenancy.

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