Free Washington Lease Extension Agreement

A lease extension is an agreement to carry an existing tenancy into a further term. It continues the existing lease rather than replacing it with a new one — that is the usual distinction between an extension and a renewal — though leases and statutes often use the two words for the same thing, so what governs is what the document in front of you actually says. It is not automatic anywhere: a tenancy continues into a new term because the lease itself provides for it, because the parties sign something, or because a statute says what happens next. In Washington the statute says a great deal. RCW 59.18.650 requires enumerated cause to end a tenancy or refuse to continue one, allows two narrow exceptions built on the length of the original agreement, and provides that a tenancy fitting neither exception becomes month-to-month rather than expiring. So the answer to “what happens if neither side does anything” is that in most cases the tenancy carries on, on a month-to-month footing, and can then be ended only for cause.

Fill in the fields below and the generator produces a clean, dated PDF that the landlord and every tenant can sign and keep a copy of. Nothing is stored and there is no charge. Fields you leave blank print as a dash so you can complete them by hand.

Watch: Free Washington Lease Extension Agreement explained

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This document records that an existing tenancy is continuing, on what terms, and for how long. It amends the lease rather than replacing it, so every term the parties do not change carries forward. In Washington it also records the facts on which § 59.18.650 turns — how long the original agreement was at the inception of the tenancy, and whether the tenancy has ever run on a periodic basis. Those are the two things the carve-outs are built on, and they are far easier to write down now than to reconstruct later. Section 59.18.650(1)(e) expressly preserves the parties’ ability to enter subsequent lease agreements complying with the requirements in subsection (2) of the section, so agreeing a renewal remains fully available; it is the unilateral refusal that the section constrains. The statute text described throughout is the version published as “(Effective until January 1, 2028.)”

• The parties, exactly as they are named on the lease being renewed.
• The property, including the unit number.
• The date the original lease was signed and the end date of the current specified period.
• The date the tenancy began, which may be earlier than the lease now being renewed. The generator below has no field for it, so write it into the document by hand – both carve-outs are measured from the inception of the tenancy, not from the lease being renewed now.
• The length of the rental agreement at the inception of the tenancy – the fact both carve-outs turn on.
• Whether the tenancy has been on a month-to-month or periodic basis at any point since it began.
• The date of any 60-day written notice ending the tenancy, and how it was served.
• The new term – its start date, and its end date if it is a fixed term.
• The rent for the new term, whether it has changed, and the date written notice of any increase was given.
• Whether the tenancy is a subsidised tenancy in which rent is based on household income or circumstances.
• Whether the property is in Seattle – and, if it is, the date the landlord’s renewal offer under SMC 7.24.030.J was made and the date by which the tenant had to answer it.
• Every other term that is changing, and a statement that the rest continue unchanged.
• What happens to the deposit already held.

• Reading only as far as the carve-outs. Subsection (1)(d) comes after them and supplies the default: the tenancy becomes month-to-month and can then be ended only for the causes enumerated in subsection (2) of the section.
• Relying on RCW 59.18.220 alone. It opens “Except as limited under RCW 59.18.650” and closes by making expiry conditional “upon notice consistent with RCW 59.18.650, served in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040”. Quoted with either end trimmed it reads as automatic expiry, which is not what it says.
• Treating carve-out (1)(c) as a two-part test. All three limbs are conjunctive, including limb (iii), that the tenancy has never been periodic since inception.
• Reading (1)(c)(i) as requiring a twelve-month agreement. It is disjunctive: 12 months or more at the inception, or continuous and uninterrupted successive agreements of six months or more since the inception.
• Giving less than sixty days, or serving it casually. Both carve-outs require at least 60 days’ advance written notice, and both – (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(c)(ii) alike – require service in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040.
• Treating the 60-day carve-out notice as covering a rent increase. It does not. RCW 59.18.140(3)(a) requires a minimum of 90 days’ prior written notice of an increase in the amount of rent, with a minimum of 30 days for a subsidised tenancy under (3)(b), and a minimum of 60 days for the narrow transitional class in (3)(c).
• Assuming the (2) cause list is short. It runs from (a) to (p), and one of the entries – (2)(k) – is about renewal itself: a tenant who stays on without signing a reasonable new agreement the landlord proffered at least 30 days before expiration.
• Citing § 59.18.650 without a version. It is served in more than one version; this page describes the one marked “Effective until January 1, 2028”.
• Stopping at state law when the property is in Seattle. SMC 7.24.030.J requires the landlord to offer the tenant of an expiring specified term a new tenancy on reasonable terms for the same unit, between 60 and 90 days before expiration and before offering it to anyone else, with 30 days for the tenant to answer. SMC 22.205.010 then provides that an owner may not evict where the landlord has failed to comply with 7.24.030.J and the reason for terminating is that the tenancy ended at the expiration of a specified term or period.
• Reading Seattle’s just cause list as including expiry of the term. SMC 22.205.010 says the reasons it lists, “and no others”, constitute just cause. The end of a fixed term is not one of them.

Generally not, and the statute says so in terms. RCW 59.18.650(1)(a) provides that “a landlord may not evict a tenant, refuse to continue a tenancy, or end a periodic tenancy except for the causes enumerated in subsection (2) of this section and as otherwise provided in this subsection”.

Two parts of that sentence do work. The words “refuse to continue a tenancy” are the statute’s own, so non-renewal is inside the prohibition as a matter of text rather than by analogy from eviction law. And the closing words — “as otherwise provided in this subsection” — point at subsection (1) itself, which is where the two without-cause exits are set out. A reader sent to subsection (2) instead would find only the cause list and would conclude, wrongly, that there is no without-cause route at all.

None of that makes renewal automatic. A tenancy carries into a further term because the lease provides for it, because the parties sign a renewal, or because a statute supplies a default. What Washington regulates is the other branch: the decision not to continue.

That regulation reaches back into an older provision. RCW 59.18.220(1) reads in full: “Except as limited under RCW 59.18.650, in cases where premises are rented for a specified time, by express or implied contract, the tenancy shall be deemed expired at the end of such specified time upon notice consistent with RCW 59.18.650, served in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040.” Both ends of that sentence are load-bearing. Expiry is limited by § 59.18.650 at the front, and conditioned on notice at the back. Anyone quoting the middle of it — “the tenancy shall be deemed expired at the end of such specified time” — is quoting a rule that has been made subordinate and stripped of the condition that now governs it.

Section 59.18.220 also carries an armed forces exception in subsection (2): a tenant who is a member of the armed forces, national guard or reserves, or that tenant’s spouse or dependent, may end a tenancy for a specified time on receiving permanent change of station or deployment orders, giving written notice of 20 days or more with a copy of the orders or a commanding officer’s letter meeting one of six listed criteria.

Subsection (1) allows two routes to ending a tenancy without cause, and both are built on the length of the agreement at the inception of the tenancy.

Carve-out (1)(b) applies where the rental agreement provides for the tenancy to continue for an indefinite period on a month-to-month or periodic basis after the agreement expires. The landlord may end it at the end of the initial period without cause only if: “(i) At the inception of the tenancy, the landlord and tenant entered into a rental agreement between six and 12 months; and (ii) The landlord has provided the tenant before the end of the initial lease period at least 60 days’ advance written notice ending the tenancy, served in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040.”

Carve-out (1)(c) applies where the agreement does not continue indefinitely. The landlord may end it without cause on expiration only if: “(i) At the inception of the tenancy, the landlord and tenant entered into a rental agreement of 12 months or more for a specified period, or the landlord and tenant have continuously and without interruption entered into successive rental agreements of six months or more for a specified period since the inception of the tenancy; (ii) The landlord has provided the tenant before the end of the specified period at least 60 days’ advance written notice that the tenancy will be deemed expired at the end of such specified period, served in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040; and (iii) The tenancy has not been for an indefinite period on a month-to-month or periodic basis at any point since the inception of the tenancy.”

Two things are commonly lost in summary. The first is that limb (i) is disjunctive: a chain of continuous, uninterrupted six-month agreements running back to the inception qualifies just as a single agreement of twelve months or more does. The second is that the service requirement is not confined to (1)(b). Sub-limb (1)(c)(ii) carries the identical words — “served in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040” — so a notice under either carve-out has to be served the way that section requires, not merely written and sent.

All three limbs of (1)(c) are joined by “and”. The third is the one most easily dropped and the one most likely to defeat reliance on the carve-out: a tenancy that ran month-to-month for even a stretch at some point since it began is outside (1)(c) however long the current agreement is. Summarising (1)(c) as “twelve months plus sixty days’ notice” materially overstates the landlord’s freedom.

A transitional provision sits inside (1)(c) as well: for a tenancy of indefinite period in existence as of May 10, 2021, where the parties entered a rental agreement between that date and three months following the expiration of the governor’s proclamation 20-19.6 or any extensions thereof, the landlord may exercise rights under this subsection (1)(c) as if the rental agreement was entered into at the inception of the tenancy — provided that the rental agreement is otherwise in accordance with this subsection (1)(c). The transitional rule relocates the inception date; it does not excuse limbs (i) to (iii).

This is the question a renewal page exists to answer, and in Washington it is most often reported backwards, because the sentence that supplies the answer comes after the two carve-outs.

§ 59.18.650(1)(d): “For all other tenancies of a specified period not covered under (b) or (c) of this subsection, and for tenancies of an indefinite period on a month-to-month or periodic basis, a landlord may not end the tenancy except for the causes enumerated in subsection (2) of this section. Upon the end date of the tenancy of a specified period, the tenancy becomes a month-to-month tenancy.”

So the ordinary Washington fixed term — one that does not satisfy (b) or (c) — does not expire when nobody acts. On its end date it becomes a month-to-month tenancy by operation of law, and from that point it can be ended only for one of the causes in subsection (2) of the section. Rent continues to fall due; the tenant continues in possession lawfully; and the landlord’s route out narrows to the cause list.

Because that is a statutory default rather than a contractual one, it does not depend on the lease saying anything about holdover, and a lease term to the contrary does not reach it. It is also why the practical value of writing a renewal down in Washington is high even where the parties are content: the signed document fixes the term, the rent and the facts the carve-outs turn on, instead of leaving the tenancy to convert silently and the evidence to be reconstructed later.

Subsection (1)(e) adds that nothing prohibits the parties “from entering into subsequent lease agreements that are in compliance with the requirements in subsection (2) of this section” — which is to say, agreeing a renewal remains entirely available. It is the unilateral refusal to continue that the section constrains.

§ 59.18.650(1)(f): “A tenant may end a tenancy for a specified time by providing notice in writing not less than 20 days prior to the ending date of the specified time.”

Twenty days is short, and it is shorter than the sixty days the carve-outs require of a landlord. A tenant who wants to leave at the end of a specified term therefore has a clear and relatively late route, but it is still a route that requires writing something and dating it. A tenant who says nothing and stays on is in the (1)(d) position described above: the tenancy becomes month-to-month.

§ 59.18.650(2) opens: “The following reasons listed in this subsection constitute cause pursuant to subsection (1) of this section”. The list runs from (a) to (p) and is summarised here in full. Each entry below is a description, not a quotation, and each carries its own notice period and its own conditions — read the subsection itself before relying on any of them.

(2)(a) Rent default. The tenant continues in possession after a default in the payment of rent and after a written notice requiring, in the alternative, payment of the rent or surrender of the premises has gone uncomplied with for the period set forth in RCW 59.12.030(3). The notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due.

(2)(b) Substantial breach. Continued possession after a substantial breach of a material program requirement of subsidised housing, a material lease term subscribed to by the tenant, or a tenant obligation imposed by law other than one for monetary damages — after a written notice specifying the acts or omissions and requiring, in the alternative, that the breach be remedied or the agreement end, with a remedy date at least 10 days after service.

(2)(c) Waste, nuisance or interference. Continued possession after at least three days’ advance written notice to quit, where the tenant commits or permits waste or nuisance, unlawful activity affecting the use and enjoyment of the premises, or other substantial or repeated and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises by the landlord or by the tenant’s neighbours.

(2)(d) Owner or immediate family moving in. Continued possession after the landlord in good faith seeks possession so that the owner or immediate family may occupy the unit as a principal residence, where no substantially equivalent unit is vacant and available in the same building, on at least 90 days’ advance written notice of the date possession is to end. There is a rebuttable presumption of bad faith if the owner or family fails to occupy as a principal residence for at least 60 consecutive days during the 90 days immediately after the tenant vacated.

(2)(e) Sale of a single-family residence. Continued possession after the owner elects to sell, on at least 90 days’ advance written notice. The statute defines “elects to sell” as making reasonable attempts to sell within 30 days after the tenant vacates, at a minimum by listing at a reasonable price with a realty agency or on the multiple listing service, and sets out two rebuttable presumptions against an intent to sell: no such listing within 30 days of the tenant vacating, or a withdrawal from the market, a letting to someone other than the former tenant, or a comparable indication within 90 days after the tenant vacated or the property was listed, whichever is later.

(2)(f) Notice under RCW 59.18.200(2)(c). Continued possession after the landlord serves the tenant with advance written notice under that provision.

(2)(g) Withdrawal for a conversion. Continued possession after the owner elects to withdraw the premises to pursue a conversion under RCW 64.34.440 or 64.90.655. This is the one place inside this page’s scope where the two served versions of the section differ: the version effective from January 1, 2028 cites only RCW 64.90.655.

(2)(h) Condemned or uninhabitable premises. Continued possession after at least 30 days’ advance written notice to vacate stating that the premises has been certified or condemned as uninhabitable by a local agency with authority to issue such an order and that continued habitation would subject the landlord to civil or criminal penalties. Where the agency’s order does not allow 30 days, the landlord must give as much advance written notice as is possible while still complying with the order.

(2)(i) Shared dwelling unit or facilities. Continued possession after an owner or lessor who shares the dwelling unit, or access to a common kitchen or bathroom, has served at least 20 days’ advance written notice to vacate before the end of the rental term or, for a periodic tenancy, the end of the rental period.

(2)(j) Transitional housing. Continued possession in transitional housing after at least 30 days’ advance written notice to vacate, in advance of the expiration of the transitional housing program, or where the tenant has aged out of it, or has completed an educational, training or service program and is no longer eligible. The statute adds that nothing in (2)(j) prevents ending a transitional housing tenancy for any of the other listed causes.

(2)(k) Refusing a proffered new agreement — the renewal cause. Continued possession after the expiration of a rental agreement without signing a proposed new rental agreement proffered by the landlord, provided the landlord proffered it at least 30 days before the expiration of the current agreement and any new terms and conditions are reasonable. Subsection (2)(k) does not apply to tenants whose tenancies are or have become periodic. This is the entry a renewal page most needs: it makes a tenant’s refusal of a reasonable, timely renewal offer a cause — but only for a tenancy that has not gone periodic, and only where both the 30-day lead time and the reasonableness of the new terms hold.

(2)(l) Application misrepresentation. Continued possession after at least 30 days’ advance written notice to vacate, where there were intentional, knowing and material misrepresentations or omissions on the tenant’s application at the inception of the tenancy which, absent them, would have led the landlord to request additional information or take an adverse action.

(2)(m) Other good cause. Continued possession after at least 60 days’ advance written notice to vacate before the end of the period or agreement, for other good cause constituting a legitimate economic or business reason not covered by or related to another basis in subsection (2). Where a landlord relies on this ground, the court may stay a writ of restitution for up to 60 additional days for good cause shown, including difficulty procuring alternative housing, conditioned on the tenant continuing to pay rent during the stay, and must award court costs and fees as the chapter allows.

(2)(n) Four or more cured violations. Continued possession after at least 60 days’ written notice to vacate before the end of the period or agreement, where the tenant committed four or more qualifying violations within the preceding 12-month period, other than ones for monetary damages, the tenant remedied or cured each, and the landlord gave a written warning notice at the time of each. The qualifying violations are substantial breaches of a material program requirement of subsidised housing, of a material lease term, or of a tenant obligation imposed by law. Each warning notice must specify the violation, give an opportunity to cure, state that the landlord may end the tenancy at the end of the term on four violations within a 12-month period, and state that correcting the fourth or a later violation is not a defence. The 60-day notice must state that the agreement ends on the specified ending date or a designated date not less than 60 days after delivery, whichever is later, specify the reason and supporting facts, and be served concurrent with or after the fourth or subsequent warning notice. The notice must include all the notices supporting the basis, the notices must pertain to four or more separate incidents, and the landlord is still required to demonstrate by admissible evidence that the violations would have been breaches under (2)(b) had the tenant not cured them.

(2)(o) Sex offender registration. Continued possession after at least 60 days’ advance written notice to vacate before the end of the rental period or agreement, where the tenant is required to register as a sex offender during the tenancy, or failed to disclose such a requirement when required in the rental application or otherwise known to the owner at the beginning of the tenancy.

(2)(p) Sexual harassment. Continued possession after at least 20 days’ advance written notice to vacate before the end of the rental period or agreement, where the tenant has made unwanted sexual advances or committed other acts of sexual harassment directed at the property owner, property manager, a property employee or another tenant, based on the person’s race, gender or other protected status, in violation of a covenant or term in the lease.

Three further provisions govern how the list is used. Subsection (5) provides that nothing in (2)(d), (e) or (f) permits a landlord to end a tenancy for a specified period before the completion of the term unless the parties mutually consent in writing to ending it early and the tenant is afforded at least 60 days to vacate. Subsection (6) requires that all written notices under subsection (2) be served in a manner consistent with RCW 59.12.040 and identify the facts and circumstances known and available to the landlord at the time of issuance, with enough specificity to let the tenant respond and prepare a defence; the landlord may add facts later only if they were unknown or unavailable when the notice issued. Subsection (4) provides that a landlord who removes a tenant in violation of the section is liable for wrongful eviction, and a prevailing tenant is entitled to the greater of economic and noneconomic damages or three times the monthly rent of the dwelling at issue, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs.

Subsection (3) sits slightly outside the renewal question but often arrives with it: where a tenant has permanently vacated other than by the landlord ending the tenancy, the landlord must serve any remaining occupant who had coresided with the tenant “at least six months prior to and up to the time the tenant permanently vacated” a notice requiring the occupant either to apply to become a party to the rental agreement or to vacate within 30 days. Both halves of that phrase are conditions: six months at some earlier point in the tenancy is not enough, and the six months has to run up to the moment the departing tenant left. The landlord may apply the same screening, background and financial criteria used for any other prospective tenant. An occupant who becomes a party is then protected by subsection (2) like any other tenant.

One limit belongs with that, and it attaches to the succession rule rather than to the cause list. Subsection (3) closes: “This subsection does not apply to tenants residing in subsidized housing.” The words “this subsection” mean (3) — the succession provision just described — and not subsection (2). The enumerated-cause protection in (2) reaches subsidised tenants in terms: (2)(b) and (2)(n) both turn on a substantial breach of “a material program requirement of subsidized housing”, and subsection (3)’s own preceding sentence says such an occupant may not be removed “except as provided under subsection (2)”. Reading that closing sentence as though it disapplied the cause list would take just-cause protection away from precisely the tenants the section names most often.

Renewal is usually where the rent changes, and Washington sets the notice period by statute rather than leaving it to the lease. RCW 59.18.140(3)(a): “Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this subsection, a landlord shall provide a minimum of 90 days’ prior written notice of an increase in the amount of rent to each affected tenant, and any increase in the amount of rent may not become effective prior to the completion of the term of the rental agreement.”

Two things follow. The notice period is a minimum of ninety days, and the timing is capped independently: even a properly noticed increase cannot take effect before the current term completes. For a renewal that means the new rent belongs to the new term, and the notice has to have gone out well before the old term ends.

(3)(b) subsidised tenancies. Where the rental agreement governs a subsidised tenancy in which the amount of rent is based on the tenant’s income or on circumstances specific to the subsidised household, the minimum is 30 days’ prior written notice, and the increase may become effective on completion of the term of the rental agreement or sooner by mutual consent.

(3)(c) the transitional class. For a tenant whose lease or rental agreement was entered into or renewed before May 7, 2025 and whose tenancy is for a specified time, where the agreement had more than 60 but less than 90 days left before the end of the specified time as of May 7, 2025, the landlord must give written notice a minimum of 60 days before the effective date of the increase. That is a bridging rule for agreements caught mid-term by the change, not a general alternative to (3)(a).

The same section deals with other changes. § 59.18.140(2) provides that, except for termination of tenancy and an increase in the amount of rent, a new rule of tenancy may become effective after 30 days’ written notice to each affected tenant, upon completion of the term of the rental agreement or sooner upon mutual consent. And § 59.18.140(1) requires a tenant to conform to all reasonable obligations or restrictions concerning the use, occupation and maintenance of the dwelling unit, provided they do not violate the chapter or other law and were brought to the tenant’s attention at the time of initial occupancy so as to become part of the rental agreement.

None of these rent-notice periods replaces the 60-day notice the § 59.18.650 carve-outs require. They run on separate clocks and answer separate questions: one is about changing the rent, the other is about ending the tenancy.

Everything above is state law. If the property is in Seattle, a second layer applies, and one of its sentences is about non-renewal in terms.

Seattle Municipal Code chapter 22.205 is the city’s just cause eviction ordinance. § 22.205.010 provides that an owner of a housing unit “shall not evict or attempt to evict any tenant, or otherwise terminate or attempt to terminate the tenancy of any tenant, unless the owner can prove in court that just cause exists”, and then lists the reasons that qualify: “The reasons for termination of tenancy listed below, and no others, shall constitute just cause under this Chapter 22.205”. The list runs from A to P and covers, among other things, failure to comply with the statutory pay-or-vacate and comply-or-vacate notices; habitual late payment; habitual breach of material lease terms; an owner or an immediate family member moving in, on at least 90 days’ notice; the sale of a single-family dwelling unit, on at least 90 days’ notice; substantial rehabilitation, demolition or conversion, each conditioned on the owner holding the permits and any tenant relocation licence first; an emergency vacate order; an owner discontinuing the sharing of the owner’s own housing unit; and criminal activity on or abutting the premises. The expiry of a fixed term is not on the list.

The sentence that matters most here comes before the list. Regardless of whether just cause may exist, an owner may not evict a residential tenant if the unit is not registered with the Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections where registration is required, or — in the ordinance’s own words — if “the landlord has failed to comply with subsection 7.24.030.J as required and the reason for terminating the tenancy is that the tenancy ended at the expiration of a specified term or period”. That is this page’s subject, named by the city code and made a bar to eviction in its own right.

SMC 7.24.030.J is a right of first refusal on renewal. Except in the four cases below, the landlord must offer the tenant whose tenancy for a specified time is expiring a new tenancy on reasonable terms for the same rental unit, starting the day after the existing tenancy expires. The offer has to be made between 60 and 90 days before the expiration and before the landlord offers the unit to any third party; the proposed rental agreement must be delivered in accordance with RCW 59.12.040; and the tenant must be given 30 days to accept or decline it. There is a rebuttable presumption that the landlord failed to offer reasonable terms if the existing tenant declines the proposal and, within 30 days after that tenant vacates, the landlord lists the unit for rent on terms materially more favourable to a prospective tenant.

A landlord may decline to make that offer only if: the tenant gave written notice, at least 60 days before expiration, of an intention to vacate voluntarily; the landlord asserts a just cause under § 22.205.010 and complies with 7.24.030.J.3; the existing rental agreement already provides for the tenancy to continue month to month after it expires; or, more than 90 days before expiration, the parties agreed a new rental agreement for the same unit starting the day after the previous one ends. Asserting a just cause is not a shortcut: under J.3 the landlord must give written notice between 60 and 90 days before expiration, informing the tenant of every just cause asserted and the facts supporting each, and remains responsible for the notice periods, relocation assistance and other remedies that cause carries under § 22.205.010.

Failure to comply with J.1 or J.3 gives the tenant a private right of action for three months’ rent under the terms of the expired rental agreement, costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees. Three further provisions of chapter 22.205 sit around all of this: § 22.205.020 voids any rental agreement provision purporting to waive a right created by the chapter; § 22.205.030 requires an owner terminating a protected tenancy to state the reasons and the supporting facts in writing; and § 22.205.050 makes the absence of just cause a defence to any action to evict or otherwise terminate a tenancy.

Read alongside RCW 59.18.650, the effect in Seattle is cumulative rather than alternative. The state section already means that a fixed term outside the two carve-outs becomes month-to-month instead of expiring. The city adds that, where a landlord’s reason for ending the tenancy is that the term ran out, failing the renewal-offer duty in 7.24.030.J bars the eviction outright. This section describes Seattle only; it is the one Washington city code captured for this page, and other cities may have their own rules.

The captured text of § 59.18.650 relied on here is the version published as “(Effective until January 1, 2028.)” The capture also contains the version marked “(Effective January 1, 2028.)”, and within the material this page covers the two diverge in one place: the conversion cause at (2)(g), which the later version ties to RCW 64.90.655 alone rather than to RCW 64.34.440 or 64.90.655.

Saying which version was read is not pedantry. Washington’s legislature site serves multiple versions of amended statutes, and a page that quotes one without naming it gives the reader no way to check whether it is the version that applies to them. If you are reading this after a change takes effect, compare against the version then current.

The captured Washington material is RCW 59.18.650, § 59.18.220 and § 59.18.140, and all three were read end to end for this page — including the whole of the subsection (2) cause list and the whole of § 59.18.140(3).

What this page does not do is set out the sections those three cross-refer to. RCW 59.12.040 fixes the manner of service, RCW 59.12.030(3) supplies the rent-default period, and RCW 59.18.200(2)(c), RCW 64.34.440 and RCW 64.90.655 are each pulled in by a single cause. This page states only what §§ 59.18.650, 59.18.220 and 59.18.140 say about them; where one of them governs your situation, read it directly.

On local law, one city was read and the rest were not, and it is worth saying which. Seattle Municipal Code chapter 22.205 and SMC 7.24.030 were captured and are described in the section above, because both speak directly to this page’s subject. No other Washington city’s code was searched — several have their own just-cause and notice rules — and no case law was consulted, so nothing here should be read as a statement that your city imposes no additional requirement or that a court has not construed these provisions. Check the current statute and your own city’s code before acting.

The sequence above covers the five steps that matter most. These follow from the same provisions and are worth doing in the same sitting.

• Record the new term and the new rent. A renewal amends the existing lease. Name what is changing and state that everything else continues unchanged, and keep the signed copy with the original lease.
• Write down the date the tenancy began, even though the generator has no field for it. Both carve-outs in RCW 59.18.650(1)(b) and (1)(c) are measured from the inception of the tenancy, which can be years earlier than the lease being renewed now, and (1)(c)(iii) asks whether the tenancy has ever been periodic since that date. Add both facts to the document by hand while they are still easy to establish.
• If the property is in Seattle, work to the city’s calendar rather than the state’s. SMC 7.24.030.J requires the landlord to offer a new tenancy on reasonable terms for the same unit between 60 and 90 days before an expiring specified term ends, before offering it to any third party, delivered in accordance with RCW 59.12.040, with 30 days for the tenant to answer. Asserting a just cause instead takes its own written notice in the same 60-to-90-day window, naming each cause and the facts supporting it. SMC 22.205.010 bars an eviction whose stated reason is that the term expired where that duty was not met, and SMC 22.205.030 requires the reasons and supporting facts to be in writing.

An extension is mostly a matter of contract, so what it can do is decided by the existing lease before it is decided by statute. The place state law bites hardest is the rent, because continuing a tenancy is when it usually changes. Our guide to Washington rent increase laws sets out the notice that has to come first, which is often the real deadline in that negotiation.

The second place is what happens when the parties do not agree. An expiring term does not resolve itself, and Washington eviction notice laws explain the notices and timelines that follow if a tenant stays on without a new agreement.

For the obligations that run between a landlord and a tenant throughout the tenancy, and the rules that apply to both sides, see Washington landlord tenant laws.

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