Illinois Tenant Screening Laws: The Landlord and Applicant Guide

Illinois tenant screening sits at the crossroads of three bodies of law: the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, which governs how a consumer report may be pulled and used everywhere in the country; the Illinois Human Rights Act, which since January 1, 2023 protects source of income and a long list of other classes; and a growing set of Illinois-specific rules, headed by the portable tenant screening report law at 765 Illinois Compiled Statutes 705/30 and, in Cook County, the Just Housing Amendment that reshapes how criminal history may be used. The Illinois landlords who screen properly almost never face a lawsuit. The ones who skip the consent form or the adverse action notice pay for that shortcut, and fee-shifting to a consumer who wins is what makes the bill so large.

This guide walks the whole framework in plain English: what the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act actually requires of a landlord and the employment-only rules that landlord websites keep importing into housing, the fact that Illinois sets no statewide screening-fee cap today and the $50 cap that arrives on January 1, 2027 under 765 ILCS 705/35, the new portable screening report law that waives the application fee, source-of-income protection under the Illinois Human Rights Act and House Bill 2775, what survives the withdrawal of HUD’s 2016 criminal-records guidance, the mandatory two-step Cook County Just Housing Amendment process with its five-day and three-business-day clocks, the rights every applicant holds, a day-by-day screening workflow, a compliance playbook, real scenarios, and an Illinois-specific set of frequently asked questions.

Because Illinois layers state and county protections on top of the federal baseline, the safest posture for a landlord is written consent, consistent written criteria, and proper adverse action notices every single time, and the strongest position for an applicant is to know exactly which rights the law confers. Treat every figure here as a starting point and verify the current statute and any local ordinance before you screen, charge a fee, or dispute a decision.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act, codified at fifteen U.S.C. section 1681, is the federal statute that governs tenant screening nationwide, and an Illinois landlord must comply with it regardless of any state-law differences, then add Illinois’s own rules. Getting both layers right prevents almost all screening-related liability. Five points sit at the core, and each one is load-bearing — but two of them are described wrongly on most landlord websites, because they are borrowed from the FCRA’s employment screening rules and do not apply to housing at all.

Permissible Purpose

A landlord has a permissible purpose under Fair Credit Reporting Act section 604(a)(3)(F)(i), 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i) — a legitimate business need for the information “in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer.” A rental application is exactly that, and subparagraph (F)(ii) covers a review of an existing tenancy at renewal. The screening company will require the landlord to certify that purpose before it releases a report. This is the landlord’s actual federal authority to obtain the report — not the employment-screening disclosure-and-authorization rule, which is a different subsection entirely. It opens the door to a report the landlord must then handle correctly.

Written Consent

Get written consent from every applicant — but know why, because this is the first of the two items landlord guides get wrong. The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s stand-alone written disclosure and authorization rule is section 604(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(b)(2), and its opening words are “a person may not procure a consumer report … for employment purposes.” It is not a housing requirement, and a page that presents it as one is importing an employment rule into a tenancy. What makes written consent close to mandatory in practice is contractual and evidentiary: every consumer reporting agency conditions service on a landlord certification of permissible purpose, and virtually all of them require signed applicant authorization as well; and a signed, clear and conspicuous standalone form is the landlord’s only proof if the pull is ever questioned. Illinois adds no statewide written-consent statute of its own. So the practical advice does not change — always in writing, on its own form, before the report is pulled — only the legal basis for it does.

Consistent Criteria

Written screening criteria must be applied consistently to every applicant. Inconsistency creates disparate-treatment exposure under fair-housing law — the federal Fair Housing Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act — and, where it touches how reports are obtained or used, Fair Credit Reporting Act exposure as well, because bending the rule for one applicant and not another is powerful evidence of discrimination even where none was intended. Illinois’s portable screening report law also assumes a written, consistent criteria set.

No Pre-Adverse Action Notice in Housing

The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not impose a pre-adverse action step on a landlord. The familiar two-step procedure — send the applicant a copy of the report plus the summary of rights, then wait before acting — is section 604(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(b)(3). That subsection is captioned “Conditions for furnishing and using consumer reports for employment purposes,” and its own text limits it to “using a consumer report for employment purposes.” Section 603(h), 15 U.S.C. section 1681a(h), defines employment purposes as evaluating a consumer “for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee.” A tenancy is none of those four things.

Three consequences follow, and each one contradicts what most Illinois screening guides say. A landlord owes no duty to enclose the report. A landlord owes no duty to enclose the summary of rights. And federal law sets no waiting period of any length between the decision and the notice — section 1681b(b)(3) states no number of days even in the employment context, so the “at least five business days” figure that circulates on landlord sites has no federal source in housing at all. Where a genuine pre-denial notice-and-response duty does exist, it comes from state or local fair-chance housing law. In Illinois that means Cook County, and only Cook County — covered in detail below. It never comes from the FCRA.

One real federal pre-report duty can reach a landlord, and it is a different thing: if the landlord orders an investigative consumer report — personal interviews about character, general reputation or mode of living — 15 U.S.C. section 1681d(a) requires written disclosure to the applicant, mailed or delivered not later than three days after the report was first requested, together with the summary of rights. That is a disclosure that the report is being prepared, not a notice before a denial.

Adverse Action Notice

This is the landlord’s real federal notice duty, and it runs after the decision. Under section 615(a), 15 U.S.C. section 1681m(a), anyone who takes an adverse action based in whole or in part on information in a consumer report must give the consumer notice of that action and must provide the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the report, a statement that the agency did not make the decision and cannot give the specific reasons for it, notice of the right to a free copy of the report from that agency within sixty days, and notice of the right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of the information. If a numerical credit score was used in the decision, section 1681m(a)(2) also requires disclosing the score and the key factors that adversely affected it. The notice may be oral, written or electronic — the Federal Trade Commission’s landlord guidance calls written notice the best practice, not a legal requirement.

Note what section 1681m(a) does not require: no copy of the report, no summary of rights, no waiting period. The applicant’s route to the report is the sixty-day free copy from the agency. Note also how wide the trigger is. “Based in whole or in part” means the notice is owed even where the report was a minor factor, and “adverse action” under section 603(k)(1)(B)(iv) reaches any action taken on the applicant’s own application that is adverse to the applicant’s interests. The FTC’s own examples for landlords are denying the application, requiring a co-signer on the lease, requiring a deposit that would not be required of another applicant, requiring a larger deposit than another applicant would pay, and charging a higher rent than another applicant would pay. This step is not optional.

How much can an Illinois landlord charge for a screening fee?

Unlike a handful of states that put a hard ceiling on the application screening fee, Illinois sets no statewide cap today. A landlord may charge a reasonable fee that reflects the actual cost of obtaining the screening report, and the common market range is thirty dollars to fifty dollars for a combined credit, criminal, and eviction-history report. The fee should be disclosed to the applicant before it is collected, and a landlord who charges more than the report actually costs invites a claim that the fee is a profit center rather than a cost recovery. That answer has an expiry date, and the change is already enacted, so any fee policy written now should be built to survive it.

The $50 cap is one clause of an eleven-category junk-fee ban — and a first-page-of-the-lease disclosure rule

Section 35 is titled “Rental fee transparency and limitations,” and the application-fee cap is only § 35(c)(1) of it. Two other halves of the same section will matter more to most Illinois landlords from January 1, 2027, and neither is about screening at all.

Transparency — § 35(b). “All non-optional fees, regardless of whether they are one-time fees or recurring fees, shall be explicitly contained on the first page of a lease agreement.” The sanction is automatic: “if a fee is not explicitly contained on the first page of a lease agreement, a tenant shall not be liable for payment of such fee.” Non-optional fees must also be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in the listing itself, or in a weblink accompanying it, at the time of the listing (§ 35(b)(1)) — a “listing” being an advertisement or written notice conveying that a property is for lease and stating the rental price (§ 35(a)) — and the lease disclosure or unit listing must state whether utilities are included in rent (§ 35(b)(2)).

The junk-fee ban — § 35(c). Eleven categories of fee or fine are barred, not one. Besides the application-fee cap at (c)(1) and the duplicate screening-cost fee at (c)(2), no landlord and no lease agreement may require the tenant to pay: a fee or fine for modifying or renewing a lease (c)(3); a fee or fine for an eviction notice, or for filing an eviction action before the court grants an eviction order, though court costs and filing fees stay recoverable (c)(4); a fee for after-hours maintenance requests (c)(5); a fee for contacting the building owner or property manager about maintenance, service, lease questions or other matters directly related to the tenancy (c)(6); a fee for travel required to complete maintenance or safety repairs (c)(7); a fee for a maintenance hotline or a call to one (c)(8); a fee for the routine maintenance and upkeep of the unit (c)(9); a fee for pest abatement or removal where the tenant did not contribute to the infestation (c)(10); or a fee for an in-person walk-through at move-in or move-out (c)(11). One anti-evasion rule covers the lot: “a landlord may not rename a fee or charge to avoid application of this Section” (§ 35(e)). The application fee carries one extra protection of its own — “under no circumstances may this fee be used as a basis for an eviction action within the first year of a lease agreement.” The § 35(e) exemption for owner-occupied premises of six units or fewer, the § 35(d) home-rule floor and the § 35(f) private right of action apply to the whole section, junk-fee ban and disclosure rule included.

The single most important recent change to Illinois tenant screening is the portable, or reusable, tenant screening report law, codified at 765 Illinois Compiled Statutes 705/30, enacted by Public Act 103-0840 and effective January 1, 2025. Note the section number, because most Illinois coverage gets it wrong: this rule is Section 30 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, not Section 25. Two 2024 Public Acts each added a “Section 25” to that Act in the same session, and 765 Illinois Compiled Statutes 705/25 is the flood-hazard disclosure added by Public Act 103-754. It does not cap the fee, but it lets an applicant avoid paying a separate screening fee to every landlord by reusing one recent report, and it is the law that Illinois property-management sources and answer engines now lead with. Every Illinois landlord who charges a screening fee needs to understand when the fee must be waived.

Does Illinois require a landlord to accept a portable screening report?

The law does not compel a landlord to solicit portable reports or to abandon its own screening process. What it does is remove the fee: when an applicant supplies a qualifying reusable tenant screening report, the landlord may not charge an application screening fee, and may not charge any fee to access or use the report. A landlord may still run its own report, but it cannot bill the applicant a second time for information a qualifying portable report already provides.

What makes a portable report qualify?

To trigger the fee waiver under 765 Illinois Compiled Statutes 705/30, the reusable report must meet all of the following:

• Recent. Prepared within the previous thirty days by a consumer reporting agency.
• At the applicant’s expense. Prepared at the tenant’s own request and paid for by the tenant, not the landlord.
• Free to the landlord. Made available to the landlord at no cost to access or use, whether directly or through a third-party website.
• Complete. Includes all of the criteria the landlord consistently uses to screen applicants, along with the tenant’s identifying and contact information, a source-of-income verification, and the results of an eviction-history check.

The landlord may require the applicant to state that there has not been a material change to the information in the report. That is the whole of 765 ILCS 705/30(b)(2), which reads: “a landlord may require an applicant to state that there has not been a material change to the information in the reusable tenant screening report.” It imposes no writing requirement and no certification, so do not condition the fee waiver on a signed certificate the statute does not authorise — take the statement in writing if you want the record, but you may not demand one as the price of the waiver. Because the fee waiver only applies when the portable report covers the criteria the landlord consistently uses, this law is one more reason to keep a written, consistent set of screening criteria on file. For the paperwork behind a clean application, see our rental application guide for landlords.

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing based on seven federally protected classes, and the Illinois Human Rights Act adds a substantially longer list. Screening criteria must be facially neutral, predictive of tenancy success, and consistently applied, and they must not produce a disparate impact on any protected class — a criterion that looks neutral but disproportionately excludes a protected group can still be unlawful.

Federal Protected Classes

The Fair Housing Act protects race and color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status meaning the presence of children, and disability whether mental or physical. Whether the statutory word “sex” reaches sexual orientation and gender identity is unsettled at the federal agency level, and this page takes no position either way. HUD’s memorandum “Application to the Fair Housing Act of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,” dated 9 February 2021, was withdrawn effective 25 September 2025 — it is an item in the very same withdrawal table, Docket No. FR-6617-N-01, that withdrew the 2016 criminal-records guidance cited elsewhere on this page. The companion FHEO memorandum implementing Executive Order 13988, dated 11 February 2021, was withdrawn effective 17 September 2025 (Docket No. FR-6571-N-01). Withdrawing guidance does not amend the Fair Housing Act, and HUD’s own notice states that actions not complying with the text of the Act remain subject to enforcement — so the federal question is open, not resolved in either direction. An Illinois landlord does not need it resolved, because Illinois law reaches both classes directly. Sexual orientation is a protected basis under the Illinois Human Rights Act, and 775 ILCS 5/1-103(O-1) defines it as “actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or gender-related identity, whether or not traditionally associated with the person’s designated sex at birth.” One narrow Illinois exemption exists: 775 ILCS 5/3-106(H-1) exempts the owner of an owner-occupied residential building with four or fewer units from rent-or-not decisions based on an applicant’s sexual orientation. In many jurisdictions source of income is protected as well, and in Illinois it is protected statewide.

Illinois’s Expanded Protections

The Illinois Human Rights Act, enforced by the Illinois Department of Human Rights, layers on additional protected characteristics, including source of income, ancestry, age (which section 1-103(A) of the Act defines as 40 or older), marital status, order of protection status, military status, unfavorable discharge from military service, pregnancy, and immigration status. Illinois’s list is among the broader ones in the country, which is why criteria that pass muster elsewhere can still create liability here.

Common Illinois Fair-Housing Traps

• Blanket criminal-history bans that auto-reject any record, which violate the disparate-impact doctrine and, in Cook County, the Just Housing Amendment.
• Rigid credit-score cutoffs applied with no individualized review of the applicant’s full picture.
• Income multipliers that disproportionately exclude single parents, implicating familial status.
• No-Section-8 policies, which are unlawful under Illinois’s source-of-income protection.
• Denying reasonable accommodations to applicants with a disability.
• Inconsistent application of criteria across applicants of different protected classes.

One of the most consequential Illinois rules for screening is source-of-income protection. House Bill 2775, signed in 2022 and effective January 1, 2023, amended the Illinois Human Rights Act to add source of income as a protected class in real-estate transactions. The definition at 775 ILCS 5/1-103(O-5) is a single generic sentence — “‘Source of income’ means the lawful manner by which an individual supports himself or herself and his or her dependents” — and it reaches a Housing Choice Voucher, often called Section 8, along with disability payments and other rental assistance, as lawful manners of support. Be precise about how: unlike California’s Government Code section 12955(p)(1), which names Section 8 vouchers in terms, the Illinois Act names nothing — neither section 1-103(O-5) nor 775 ILCS 5/3-102 mentions vouchers, Section 8 or rental assistance, so the coverage follows from the breadth of the definition rather than from an express list. As a result, an Illinois landlord may not refuse to rent, may not advertise a no-voucher policy, and may not apply harsher screening simply because an applicant intends to pay part of the rent with a voucher.

This does not strip the landlord of the right to screen. The landlord may still apply neutral, consistent criteria — credit, income relative to the tenant’s own share of rent, rental history — to a voucher holder exactly as to any other applicant. What the law forbids is treating the voucher itself as a disqualifier or steering voucher holders away. A common and costly mistake is calculating an income multiplier against the full contract rent rather than the tenant’s out-of-pocket share, which can screen out voucher holders as a group and expose the landlord to a source-of-income claim.

Start with what changed, because almost every Illinois landlord page is out of date here. HUD’s 2016 criminal-records guidance was withdrawn effective September 25, 2025 (Federal Register, Notice of the Withdrawal of OGC Guidance Documents, Docket No. FR-6617-N-01), and the 2022 memo implementing it was withdrawn effective September 17, 2025 (Docket No. FR-6571-N-01). It is no longer the standard, and citing it as current is a mistake.

What survives matters more than what went. The Fair Housing Act itself is unchanged, and HUD’s discriminatory-effects rule at 24 CFR 100.500 — reinstated effective May 1, 2023, and currently the subject of a pending HUD proposal to remove it, proposed only, not adopted — still makes an overbroad criminal-records policy actionable where it causes a discriminatory effect the landlord cannot justify. That rule is a burden-shifting litigation standard: it imposes no individualized-assessment step and no pre-denial notice of its own.

Illinois adds a substantive limit that many guides miss. The Illinois Human Rights Act makes arrest record a protected basis in real-estate transactions (775 ILCS 5/1-103(B-5) and 5/3-102, with a carve-out at 5/3-102.5 for unlawful activity on the premises), so in a covered rental a denial resting on an arrest that never became a conviction is unlawful, not merely inadvisable. Two precision points that most guides drop, and that decide real cases. First, the protected term is wider than “an arrest with no conviction.” Section 1-103(B-5) defines “arrest record” as (1) an arrest not leading to a conviction, (2) a juvenile record, or (3) criminal history record information ordered expunged, sealed, or impounded under Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act. All three are off-limits, not just the first. Second, the bar is not absolute. Section 3-102 is expressly subject to the exemptions at 775 ILCS 5/3-106, which provide that nothing in § 3-102 prohibits, among other things: the rental of a housing accommodation in a building containing accommodations for not more than 4 families living independently of each other, if the owner resides in one of them (§ 3-106(B)); the rental of a room or rooms in a private home where the owner or a family member lives there (§ 3-106(C)); or an inquiry into or use of an arrest record that is “otherwise authorized by State or federal law” (§ 3-106(K)). Two more belong on any criminal-history checklist and are almost always left off. § 3-106(G) exempts “conduct against a person because such person has been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance as defined in Section 102 of the federal Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)” — the one conviction category the Act itself lifts outside § 3-102. Read its limits carefully: it is manufacture or distribution, not possession or use; it requires a conviction, so an arrest for the same conduct stays protected as an arrest record; and because § 3-106 opens by exempting the listed conduct from the whole of § 3-102, that reach includes the § 3-102(H) effects test — but only for a criterion aimed at the manufacture-or-distribution conviction itself; a broader conviction policy falls outside (G) and stays fully exposed under § 3-102(H). It does not license a blanket ban, and it is a state-law exemption only — check Cook County’s Just Housing Amendment separately for a covered property. § 3-106(J) covers a narrow case at the other end: a child sex offender who owns and resides in residential real estate may refuse to rent another unit in the same building to the parent or guardian of a child under 18. Note the limit those two building exemptions carry on their own face: each says it “does not apply to paragraph (F) of Section 3-102,” so even an exempt small owner-occupied landlord may not use an application form, make a record, or make an inquiry that indicates an arrest-record preference or limitation. Check the building before relying on an exemption. Outside Cook County, however, Illinois has no statewide ban-the-box housing law and no statewide statute requiring an individualized assessment, so the individualized approach below is a strongly recommended best practice — HUD’s April 2024 FHEO tenant-screening guidance recommends it, in the “should” register — rather than a state mandate. In Cook County it is mandatory and detailed, as the next section shows, so the property’s county decides the procedure.

The Five Assessment Factors

• Nature and severity of the offense. A decades-old shoplifting conviction differs materially from a recent violent crime or manufacturing charge.
• Time since the conviction. More recent offenses carry more predictive weight; very old convictions may have little probative value.
• Evidence of rehabilitation. Consistent employment, completed parole or probation, continuing education, or recovery documentation can rebut the presumption of risk.
• Relevance to tenancy. The offense should bear on the specific risk — violent or property crimes bear more directly than a traffic or minor drug-possession offense might.
• Consistent application. Apply the same analysis to every applicant with any criminal history; selectivity creates disparate-treatment exposure.

Can a Cook County landlord reject an applicant based on a criminal record?

Only after a strict, structured process — and this is the one place in Illinois where a real pre-denial notice-and-response duty exists. The Just Housing Amendment to the Cook County Human Rights Ordinance, codified at Cook County Code section 42-38, adopted as Ordinance 19-2394 and effective January 1, 2020 (the Board delayed enforcement remedies until after January 31, 2020), prohibits housing discrimination based on covered criminal history and imposes a mandatory two-step screening sequence, fleshed out by the Commission’s Part 700 Just Housing Amendment Interpretive Rules (added 31 December 2019, amended 9 December 2021). It applies to real estate transactions — the sale, rental, lease and sublease renewal of residential property — for property in Cook County, and it is enforced by the Cook County Commission on Human Rights. It is county law, not the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and it is far stricter than anything federal law requires of a private landlord.

To deny an otherwise-qualified applicant after step two, the landlord must be able to show that the denial is necessary to protect against a demonstrable risk to personal safety or property, based on the individualized assessment — not on the mere existence of a record. The applicant must be given an opportunity to provide evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances.

What a Cook County landlord must give the applicant before denying

This is the part the two-step summary usually leaves out, and it is where the deadlines live. Everything below comes from the Cook County Commission on Human Rights Part 700 Just Housing Amendment Interpretive Rules as published by the County; each line is cited to its rule section so it can be checked against the source.

Two more points landlords get wrong here. First, the landlord is not required to hold the unit off the market while an applicant disputes — rule § 740.120 expressly permits approving another prequalified applicant during the dispute process. Second, none of this replaces the federal notice: if a consumer report contributed to the outcome, the section 1681m(a) adverse action notice is still owed on top of the Just Housing Amendment paperwork. They are two separate duties from two separate governments, and performing one does not discharge the other.

Illinois, Chicago and Cook County: three rulebooks, one property

Most wrong answers about Illinois tenant screening come from blending three separate bodies of law that have different coverage and impose different duties. Keep them apart, and the picture is simple.

Illinois applicants have strong federal rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, supplemented by state protection under the Illinois Human Rights Act and, in Cook County, the Just Housing Amendment. Understanding these rights matters for applicants who want to contest an inaccurate report and for landlords who want to avoid liability. Applicants can learn to spot problems early using our guide to red flags in a rental application, which cuts both ways.

The Five Core Rights

• Right to know a report is being pulled. The landlord’s federal authority to obtain the report is permissible purpose under 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i), and the FCRA’s stand-alone written-authorization rule is employment-only — but every reputable screening company requires signed applicant authorization, so in practice the applicant sees and signs a consent form and may decline and withdraw. If the landlord orders an investigative consumer report (personal interviews about character, reputation or mode of living), 15 U.S.C. section 1681d(a) does require written disclosure to the applicant not later than three days after the report was first requested, together with the summary of rights.
• Right to an adverse action notice. Under 15 U.S.C. section 1681m(a), if the report causes any adverse action — rejection, a higher deposit, a higher rent, or a co-signer or other added requirement — the applicant is owed a notice after the decision, identifying the consumer reporting agency, stating that the agency did not make the decision, and explaining the sixty-day free-copy and dispute rights. There is no federal right to receive the report itself from the landlord before the decision.
• Right to a free copy of the report. When an adverse action is taken, the applicant may obtain a free copy of the report from the agency, generally within sixty days.
• Right to dispute inaccuracies. The applicant may dispute inaccurate information with the agency, which must investigate, generally within thirty days, and correct or remove anything it cannot substantiate.
• Right to sue for violations. The Fair Credit Reporting Act authorizes private lawsuits for willful or negligent violations — for a willful violation, either actual damages or statutory damages of one hundred to one thousand dollars, plus any punitive damages the court allows; for a negligent violation, actual damages — with costs and reasonable attorney fees in both cases, in a successful action.

A disciplined, day-by-day workflow is what turns the legal requirements into a repeatable process that consistently produces defensible decisions. The exact timing can flex, but the sequence — disclose, consent, report, decide, notice — should not, and in Cook County the criminal check moves to the end. A fuller walkthrough of each stage lives in our how to screen a tenant step-by-step guide.

The rules become concrete when applied to real situations. Each of the following turns on the same handful of principles — written consent, the adverse action notice, consistent criteria, source-of-income protection, the portable-report fee waiver, and the Cook County criminal-history sequence.

Illinois landlords who follow this playbook virtually never face a Fair Credit Reporting Act or fair-housing claim. The list is short, but every item is load-bearing. Build it into your standard operating procedure and the liability largely disappears.

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