Free Connecticut Holding Deposit Agreement

A holding deposit is money a prospective tenant pays to take a unit off the market before a lease is signed. Connecticut is one of the seven states compared here where the security-deposit definition is written broadly enough to make the question genuinely hard. Chapter 831 of the General Statutes is captioned “Security Deposits”, and § 47a-21(a)(11) defines a security deposit as “any advance rental payment” with named exceptions. Nothing in the definition says the payer must already be a tenant. But the cap in subsection (b) and the return and penalty in subsection (d) are written in terms of a “tenant” or a “tenancy”, and a tenant under § 47a-1(l) is a person “entitled under a rental agreement”. Because § 47a-1(i) makes a rental agreement “all agreements, written or oral”, the line between an applicant and a tenant can be crossed by a conversation. This page sets out what the text says, what it does not say, and what to write down so that the question of when an agreement was formed can be answered from a record rather than from memory.

Fill in the fields below and the generator produces a clean, dated PDF you can print, sign and give to the applicant, keeping a copy for your file. Nothing is stored and there is no charge. Fields you leave blank print as a dash so you can complete them by hand.

Watch: Free Connecticut Holding Deposit Agreement — Fillable PDF explained

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The generator above produces a holding deposit record: the parties, the unit, the amount, the monthly rent it is measured against, the date paid, a statement of whether an agreement to rent has or has not been reached, what the money becomes on signing, what happens to it if either side does not proceed, and signatures. It is not a statutory form. No Connecticut holding-deposit form appears in the text recorded for this page; chapter 831 is captioned “Security Deposits” and its definition in § 47a-21(a)(11) never uses the word “holding” or the word “applicant” in the text recorded for this page. The record exists to answer the one question the statute leaves to the parties and the courts — when was an agreement formed — from a dated document rather than from recollection. Three limits belong here. The interest provisions in subsection (i) were not extracted, so this page says that accrued interest is owed under (d)(2) without stating the rate or how it is set. Section 47a-22a, which the definition names for installment payments, was not retrieved and is not described. And this page addresses the state statute only; municipal ordinances were not researched, and no Connecticut case construing “tenant” or “advance rental payment” was read.

• The amount, in figures, and the monthly rent it is measured against — so that the § 47a-21(b) cap can be checked if the money turns out to be a security deposit: two months’ rent, or one month’s for a tenant sixty-two or older.
• The date and method of payment, because the (h)(4)(A) thirty-day disclosure runs from when “the landlord receives a security deposit”.
• A statement of whether an agreement to rent has been reached — in terms. § 47a-1(i) makes an oral agreement a rental agreement, so the record must say whether the parties have agreed or the application is still under review.
• What the money becomes on signing: security deposit, credit against the first month’s rent, or part each. The definition in (a)(11) excepts “an advance payment for the first month’s rent”, and the record should say which this is intended to be.
• What happens if the applicant does not proceed — stated as the parties’ agreement, not as a statutory rule, because § 47a-21 supplies none for money paid by someone who never became a tenant.
• What happens if the landlord does not proceed — likewise. The statute is silent on a landlord who withdraws before move-in.
• The applicant’s forwarding address, or a line for one, because the (d)(2) fifteen-day limb runs from “written notification of such tenant’s forwarding address”.
• The name of the financial institution where the money is held, if it is being treated as a security deposit, so that the (h)(4)(A) written notice can be given.
• Nothing describing the money as non-refundable in all events. If the money is a security deposit, (d)(2) requires return or a written itemised statement, and a blanket forfeiture clause is where that duty would be breached; where it is not, the statute supplies no rule and the enforceability of any forfeiture term was not researched for this page.
• Whether the applicant is sixty-two years of age or older, because § 47a-21(b)(2) sets the one-month limb of the cap for a tenant sixty-two or older, and the cap cannot be tested without it.
• Signatures and dates from both sides, and a note of anything said orally about occupancy — because under § 47a-1(i) that is where an agreement may have been formed.

• Saying holding deposits are unregulated in Connecticut. The definition in § 47a-21(a)(11) is “any advance rental payment”, and a rental agreement under § 47a-1(i) may be oral. A holding deposit taken after the parties have agreed may be a security deposit subject to every rule.
• Saying the two-month cap applies to holding deposits. § 47a-21(b) is written “In the case of a tenant”. An applicant who is not yet entitled under any agreement is not, on the text, a tenant. The cap applies if and when the money is a security deposit, and the statute does not say when that is.
• Quoting a 30-day return deadline. That figure is from P.A. 87-348 in the amendment history. The operative text of (d)(2) is twenty-one days after termination or fifteen days after a written forwarding address, whichever is later.
• Confusing the two thirty-day figures. The thirty days that is current is the (h)(4)(A) escrow-disclosure notice, running from receipt of a security deposit. It is not a return deadline.
• Applying the one-month limb without knowing the tenant’s age. (b)(2) sets one month’s rent for a tenant sixty-two or older. A landlord who has taken two months from an applicant who turns out to be sixty-two and to be a tenant under an oral agreement has exceeded the cap.
• Treating an oral yes as nothing. Under § 47a-1(i) a rental agreement means “all agreements, written or oral”. Telling an applicant the unit is theirs and taking money on the strength of it is the fact pattern in which an applicant may become a tenant before any lease exists.
• Returning the balance without the written itemised statement. (d)(2)(B) requires the balance “together with a written statement itemizing the nature and amount of such damages”. The penalty for violating any provision of subsection (d) is twice the amount of the deposit.
• Forgetting accrued interest. (d)(2)(A) requires the full amount “plus accrued interest”, and the penalty paragraph prices the failure to deliver interest alone at ten dollars or twice the interest, whichever is greater. The rate mechanism in subsection (i) was not extracted for this page.
• Importing another state’s rule. Vermont’s “however named” definition and Mississippi’s express carve-out for money paid to secure execution of a rental agreement are those states’ words, not Connecticut’s. Connecticut’s text is “any advance rental payment”.
• Treating this page as the last word on the applicant question. Whether a prospective tenant is a “tenant” for security-deposit purposes is likely answered by courts, and case law was not researched here.

Not by name, in the text recorded for this page. Connecticut has no holding-deposit statute in that text. No holding-deposit statute was found in any of the seven states compared on these pages, and Connecticut is no exception: what the text read for this page contains is chapter 831, captioned “Security Deposits”, and a definition section, § 47a-1 in chapter 830, that tells you who a “tenant” is. Whether a holding deposit is regulated in Connecticut is therefore the question whether the security-deposit statute, on its own words, reaches money paid before a rental agreement exists.

The answer the text gives is conditional, and it is the same conditional that runs through every settled state of the seven. If an agreement to rent had been formed when the money was paid — and under § 47a-1(i) that agreement may be oral — the payer may be a “tenant”, the money may be a “security deposit”, and the cap, the return deadline, the itemisation duty, the escrow disclosure and the double-damages penalty all may apply. If no agreement had been formed, the payer is on the literal text not a tenant, and the operative rules do not reach the money by their terms. Nothing in the statute tells you which side of that line a given holding deposit falls on. A page that says holding deposits are unregulated in Connecticut has ignored the definition. A page that says the two-month cap applies to them has invented a rule. This page says neither.

It is broad, and it is keyed to the nature of the payment rather than its label. § 47a-21(a)(11), verbatim:

“‘Security deposit’ means any advance rental payment, or any installment payment collected pursuant to section 47a-22a, except an advance payment for the first month’s rent or a deposit for a key or any special equipment.”

Read the structure. The general category is “any advance rental payment”. A second category, installment payments under § 47a-22a, is added; that section was not retrieved for this page and its content is not described here. Then the exceptions are carved out, in the statute’s own words: “an advance payment for the first month’s rent or a deposit for a key or any special equipment”.

Two observations follow directly from those words, and a third from what they omit. First, the definition does not depend on what the parties call the money. “Holding deposit”, “reservation deposit”, “good-faith deposit” — none of those labels appears in the text, and none of them would take an “advance rental payment” outside it. Second, the first-month exception matters to holding deposits specifically, because a holding deposit is very often agreed to be credited against the first month’s rent on signing. Whether money paid on that understanding is “an advance payment for the first month’s rent” — and so outside the definition — or is an “advance rental payment” that only later becomes rent is not something the text answers. Third, and most important, the definition itself does not say the payer must be a tenant. That limitation comes from the operative subsections, which is where the next question goes.

Only if a rental agreement exists, and a rental agreement may be oral. The definition of “tenant” is in § 47a-1(l): “the lessee, sublessee or person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit or premises to the exclusion of others or as is otherwise defined by law”. The definition of “rental agreement” is in § 47a-1(i), and it means “all agreements, written or oral”.

Now put those two definitions beside the operative rules of § 47a-21. The cap, the return deadline and the penalty are each written in terms of a “tenant” or a “tenancy”, in the words quoted earlier on this page. Every one of them is a rule about a tenant, and none of them is a rule about a person who has paid money and nothing more.

So the question for any holding deposit is whether the person who paid it was, at that moment, “entitled under a rental agreement to occupy”. An applicant whose application is still being screened, who has been promised nothing, is entitled under no agreement and is on the literal text not a tenant. An applicant who has been told the unit is theirs from a stated date, and who has paid on the strength of that, may be entitled under an oral agreement, and may therefore be a tenant — in which case the money they paid, being an advance rental payment, may be a security deposit. The text of no section here resolves which of those two an actual transaction is. That is a question of when an agreement was formed, answered by courts, and case law was not searched for this page.

If the money is a security deposit, yes; and the statute does not say whether it is. § 47a-21(b), verbatim:

“(1) In the case of a tenant under sixty-two years of age, a landlord shall not demand a security deposit in an amount that exceeds two months’ rent. (2) In the case of a tenant sixty-two years of age or older, a landlord shall not demand a security deposit in an amount that exceeds one month’s rent.”

Three features of that subsection bear on holding deposits. The verb is “demand”; the text does not say “or receive”, and this page draws no conclusion from that. The cap is split by age, and the split is expressed in terms of “a tenant” — a landlord applying it has to know both the monthly rent and whether the tenant is sixty-two or older. And both limbs are written for “a tenant”, which sends you straight back to § 47a-1(l).

The practical consequence is that the cap cannot safely be ignored merely because no lease has been signed. A landlord who demands more than two months’ rent as a holding deposit from an applicant with whom an oral agreement to rent has already been reached may have demanded a security deposit exceeding the (b)(1) cap. A landlord who demands the same sum from an applicant who is still under review, with no agreement made, has on the text demanded nothing from a tenant. The record this page generates asks for the monthly rent precisely so that the amount can be tested against (b) if it turns out to be a security deposit — and it asks whether an agreement has been reached because that is the fact the cap depends on. No separate figure for a holding deposit appears in the text recorded for this page; (b) is the only cap that text sets.

If it is a security deposit, on the (d)(2) clock; if it is not, the statute sets no deadline. The paragraph, verbatim:

“Not later than twenty-one days after termination of a tenancy or fifteen days after receiving written notification of such tenant’s forwarding address, whichever is later, each landlord other than a rent receiver shall deliver to the tenant or former tenant at such forwarding address either (A) the full amount of the security deposit paid by such tenant plus accrued interest, or (B) the balance … after deduction for any damages … together with a written statement itemizing the nature and amount of such damages.”

The clock has two limbs and takes the later of them: twenty-one days after termination of a tenancy, or fifteen days after the landlord receives written notification of the tenant’s forwarding address. Both count days, and this page prints days. The landlord must deliver either the full amount plus accrued interest, or the balance after deductions for damages together with a written statement itemizing their nature and amount. The interest is real — the paragraph requires it and the penalty paragraph prices its omission separately — but the rate and the mechanism by which it is set are in subsection (i), which was not extracted for this page and is not stated here.

Notice what starts the clock. “Termination of a tenancy” and a “forwarding address” are events in the life of a tenancy that has existed. Where a holding deposit was paid by someone who never became a tenant, neither trigger occurs, and the paragraph supplies no deadline at all. Where an oral agreement made the payer a tenant but no one ever moved in, whether a withdrawal by either side is a “termination of a tenancy” is a question the text does not answer. That is why the two sections that follow are answered from the text with the silences marked, rather than filled.

No. The 30-day figure is superseded. The amendment history to § 47a-21 records that P.A. 87-348 set a thirty-day return. The current operative text of (d)(2) is twenty-one days after termination or fifteen days after written notification of a forwarding address, whichever is later. A source that gives Connecticut’s return deadline as 30 days is quoting the annotation, not the statute, and a landlord who plans a return around 30 days may already be late.

The current thirty-day figure recorded for this page is a different duty. § 47a-21(h)(4)(A) requires written notice of the amount held and the financial institution “not later than thirty days after the landlord receives a security deposit”. That is a disclosure at the start, not a return at the end. The two figures are easy to conflate and the consequences of conflating them run in one direction: a landlord who thinks the return deadline is thirty days has less time than they think under the twenty-one-day limb, and a landlord who thinks there is no start-of-tenancy duty has missed one.

The statute does not address it, and the answer depends on which side of the line the money was on. Take the two cases the text permits.

If no agreement to rent had been reached when the money was paid — the applicant was still being screened, nothing had been promised — then the applicant was not a “tenant” under § 47a-1(l), and on the literal text the money was not a security deposit paid by a tenant. Nothing in § 47a-21 as recorded for this page says what happens to it. In the text recorded for this page there is no deadline for its return, no itemisation duty, and no penalty. The statute supplies no rule, and whether any term the parties wrote about the money would be enforced is a contract question not researched for this page. The record this page generates asks the landlord to write down, before taking the money, what happens if the applicant does not proceed, so that what was agreed can be shown; it is not a statutory rule, and this page does not present it as one or say that it would be enforced.

If an agreement to rent had been reached — the landlord said yes, the applicant said yes, and the money was paid on that footing — then under § 47a-1(i) an oral rental agreement may exist, the applicant may be a tenant, and the money may be a security deposit. From that point the text has rules, but they are written for a tenancy that ran its course. The return paragraph is triggered by “termination of a tenancy” and a forwarding address; whether an applicant’s withdrawal before moving in is a “termination of a tenancy” is not something the text says. If it is, the landlord has twenty-one days from it or fifteen from the forwarding address, whichever is later, to deliver the full amount plus accrued interest or the balance “after deduction for any damages” with a written itemised statement, and a failure is priced at twice the deposit. What “damages” covers when no one ever occupied the unit is not defined in the text recorded here, and this page does not fill it.

Two further silences. The definition excepts “an advance payment for the first month’s rent”; whether holding money agreed to be credited to the first month is inside that exception is not something the text answers, and chapter 831 as recorded here says nothing about what becomes of prepaid rent for a tenancy that never began. And no Connecticut case on any of this was read. The honest statement is that the statute as recorded gives a landlord no rule for an applicant who walks away, and whether any term the parties wrote would be enforced was not researched for this page.

The statute is silent, and the silence is complete. Nothing in § 47a-21 as recorded for this page addresses a landlord who takes a holding deposit and then declines to proceed — because a better applicant appeared, because the unit was withdrawn, because the landlord changed their mind. There is no provision naming that event, no deadline keyed to it, and no penalty for it.

The conditional applies here too. If an agreement to rent had been reached, the money may be a security deposit, and the only return machinery in the statute is (d)(2): delivery within twenty-one days of termination of a tenancy or fifteen days of a written forwarding address, whichever is later, of the full amount plus accrued interest or the balance with a written itemised statement. Whether a landlord’s own withdrawal before move-in is a “termination of a tenancy” that starts that clock is not answered by the text. If it does, a landlord holding a security deposit who neither returns it nor itemises is exposed to a violation of subsection (d), and the liability for violating any provision of that subsection is “twice the amount of any security deposit paid by such tenant”. A landlord who backs out and keeps money that turns out to have been a security deposit is therefore exposed to double the sum, if that clock was triggered. The deduction limb is “for any damages”, and what damages a landlord who withdrew could itemise is not something the text addresses.

If no agreement had been reached, the money was not a security deposit paid by a tenant, and the statute as recorded for this page is silent. Whether a landlord who withdraws must refund money paid by a non-tenant is a question of contract or restitution, and that question was not researched for this page. This page cannot cite a Connecticut provision requiring a landlord who backs out to refund a holding deposit, because the record contains none, and it does not invent one; it also does not say that the money may be kept. It can say that a landlord who treats the money as outside § 47a-21 is relying on there having been no agreement — which, given that an oral agreement counts, depends on facts the landlord may not control.

The four provisions extracted for this page, from three subsections, each of which may reach a holding deposit taken after an agreement was formed. They are not the whole of § 47a-21; the remainder of the section was not extracted and is not described here.

The cap. § 47a-21(b): not more than two months’ rent for a tenant under sixty-two, not more than one month’s rent for a tenant sixty-two or older. The verb is “demand”.

The escrow disclosure. § 47a-21(h)(4)(A): written notice of the amount held and the financial institution “not later than thirty days after the landlord receives a security deposit”. If a holding deposit was a security deposit from the day it was paid, the safe course is to treat it as received on that day and count the thirty days from then, not from the lease date. A landlord who takes a holding deposit, signs a lease some weeks later, and counts the thirty days from the signing may have counted from the wrong date.

The return and itemisation. § 47a-21(d)(2): twenty-one days after termination of a tenancy or fifteen days after written notification of a forwarding address, whichever is later; the full amount plus accrued interest, or the balance after deductions for damages with a written statement itemizing their nature and amount.

The penalty. Same paragraph: “Any landlord who violates any provision of this subsection shall be liable for twice the amount of any security deposit paid by such tenant, except that, if the only violation is the failure to deliver the accrued interest, such landlord shall be liable for ten dollars or twice the amount of the accrued interest, whichever is greater.” The measure the paragraph names is the security deposit “paid by such tenant”, not the amount withheld.

The interest that (d)(2) requires and the penalty paragraph prices is set by subsection (i), which was not extracted for this page. This page states that accrued interest is owed; it does not state the rate or the mechanism, because the record does not contain them.

The items listed above are not a wish list; each of them answers to a phrase in § 47a-21 or § 47a-1. The amount and the rent are there because § 47a-21(b) caps a security deposit at two months’ rent, or one month’s for a tenant sixty-two or older, and the only way to test the cap is to know both figures. The date of payment is there because (h)(4)(A)’s thirty-day disclosure runs from when “the landlord receives a security deposit”. The statement about whether an agreement has been reached is there because § 47a-1(i) makes an oral agreement a rental agreement and § 47a-1(l) makes a person entitled under one a tenant; that single line is the record’s answer to the question the statute leaves open. The line about what the money becomes on signing is there because (a)(11) excepts “an advance payment for the first month’s rent” and the text does not say which side of that exception holding money falls on. The forwarding address is there because the (d)(2) fifteen-day limb runs from written notification of it. The financial institution is there because (h)(4)(A) requires its disclosure.

One thing the record should not do: it should not caption itself as a statutory form. No such form appears in the text recorded for this page. It is a dated record of what was agreed, which under a statute that turns on when an agreement was formed is the most useful document either side can hold.

Seven states were read from primary text for the pages in this comparison — five from their codified publications, Mississippi from the Legislature’s bill documents, and Georgia from the General Assembly’s enacted-act PDFs. None of the seven has a holding-deposit statute. What differs is how each security-deposit definition is worded, and therefore how naturally it reaches money paid before a lease.

Connecticut defines a security deposit as “any advance rental payment” with named exceptions, then keys the cap, the return and the penalty to a “tenant” under a rental agreement that may be oral. The cap, where it applies, is two months’ rent, or one month’s for a tenant sixty-two or older.

California is the one state whose definition, unlike Connecticut’s, includes pre-lease money expressly: Civil Code § 1950.5(b) defines “security” to include any payment “imposed at the beginning of the tenancy to be used to reimburse the landlord for costs associated with processing a new tenant”, and carves out the application screening fee under § 1950.6. Its cap under (c)(1) is one month’s rent, with a narrow exception for small landlords who are natural persons or LLCs of natural persons. The word “holding” appears in the section only in “a landlord holding the security”; the reach comes from the breadth of “security”, not from a holding-deposit provision.

Vermont, by contrast, defines a security deposit under 9 V.S.A. § 4461(a) as “any advance, deposit, or prepaid rent, however named, which is refundable to the tenant at the termination or expiration of the tenancy” — reaching a holding deposit by its label but presupposing a tenancy. Vermont sets no cap. Separately, § 4456a(a) bars a landlord from charging an application fee at all; whether a non-refundable holding payment would be treated as such a fee is not answered by the text.

Iowa defines a rental deposit under § 562A.6(12) as “a deposit of money to secure performance of a residential rental agreement, other than a deposit which is exclusively in advance payment of rent”, and its rental agreement may be oral. The cap is two months’ rent. A full sweep of chapter 562A found “holding deposit” and “applicant” nowhere.

Kansas, by contrast, is the cleanest “no” on its face: K.S.A. 58-2543(m) ties the deposit to an existing rental agreement three times — the sum must be one the agreement “specifie[s]”, it is deposited “by a tenant”, and forfeiture is “under the terms of the rental agreement”. The cap is one month’s periodic rent for an unfurnished unit. The only doorway for pre-signing money is that a rental agreement may be oral.

Mississippi is the one state that names pre-lease money in order to exclude it: § 89-8-21(1) governs deposits securing performance of a rental agreement “other than a payment or deposit, including an advance payment of rent, made to secure the execution of a rental agreement”. Money paid to secure the signing is by those words outside the section, so no statutory return or penalty rule attaches to it. Mississippi sets no cap. Its text was verified from the Legislature’s own bill documents; the codified page was not reachable.

Georgia, by contrast, was read from enacted-act PDFs rather than the codified O.C.G.A. — the General Assembly’s own documents — and the record says so. § 44-7-30(3), as enacted by 2007 SB 94, defines a security deposit as money given “by a tenant to a landlord which shall be held by the landlord on behalf of a tenant by virtue of a residential rental agreement”; § 44-7-30.1 (2024 HB 404) caps it at two months’ rent for residential lease agreements entered into or renewed on or after July 1, 2024; § 44-7-34(a) requires return within 30 days after the landlord obtains possession. Across the four enacted acts no holding-deposit provision appears, and the 2007 act deleted the former exclusion of “earnest money”. Money paid before any agreement exists is not addressed; once a residential rental agreement exists and the money is held for the tenant, it is a security deposit. Two things are open: the codified text was not read, and whether a reservation payment made with no agreement is recoverable is a contract question the statute does not answer.

Connecticut’s definition names neither an existing agreement, as Kansas’s does in three places, nor pre-lease money, as California’s does expressly; it says “any advance rental payment” and leaves the agreement question to the operative subsections. Like Vermont, it reaches money by its nature rather than its label; unlike Vermont, it caps the amount. And like Iowa, Kansas and Vermont, it leaves the applicant-versus-tenant question to the definition of “rental agreement” and the courts — where Mississippi names pre-agreement money and carves it out, and California’s section carries no definition of “tenant” in the record at all.

Seven things, stated so that no reader fills them by assumption.

A word-by-word sweep of the chapter. Chapter 831 and the definitions in chapter 830 were read for this page, but no chapter-wide keyword sweep for terms such as “holding deposit”, “applicant” or “prospective” was run across either chapter and recorded. Some of the states compared below do carry such a sweep on the record; Connecticut does not. So the statement on this page is that no holding-deposit provision appears in the text read for this page — not that a search of every section of chapter 831 was performed and found none.

The rest of § 47a-21. Only (a)(11), (b), (d)(2) with its penalty, and the (h)(4)(A) notice were extracted for this page. The remaining subsections, including the balance of subsection (h), were not extracted, and this page does not describe what other duties they impose.

The interest mechanism. Subsection (i) of § 47a-21 was not extracted. This page states that (d)(2) requires the full amount “plus accrued interest” and that the penalty paragraph prices a failure to deliver interest at ten dollars or twice the interest, whichever is greater; it does not state the rate, how it is set, or when it accrues.

Section 47a-22a. The definition in (a)(11) includes “any installment payment collected pursuant to section 47a-22a”. That section was not retrieved, and this page does not describe what an installment payment is or how it is collected.

The applicant question. Whether a prospective tenant is a “tenant” for the purposes of § 47a-21 — and therefore whether a particular holding deposit is a security deposit — is the operative question on this page and is likely answered by courts. Case law was searched in no state for these pages. This page gives the conditional the text supports and does not go further.

Withdrawal before move-in. Whether an applicant’s or a landlord’s withdrawal after an oral agreement but before occupancy is a “termination of a tenancy” that starts the (d)(2) clock is not answered by the text and is not answered here.

Municipal ordinances. None were researched. This page addresses the state statute only.

Nothing on this page was filled by analogy to a neighbouring state. Where Connecticut’s text is silent, the page says so.

If the applicant becomes the tenant and the record so provides, the money on this page becomes part of the security deposit, and from that moment the rules that matter are the ones on what a landlord may hold and when it must come back. Those are set out in Connecticut security deposit laws, which is the page to read before you decide how the holding sum will be credited.

A holding deposit is taken while screening is under way, so what a landlord may ask an applicant, what a report may contain and what an adverse decision requires are the questions running alongside it. Connecticut tenant screening laws covers that ground, including the federal rules that apply in every state.

Whether an agreement to rent has been formed is the fact this whole page turns on, and it is a question of general landlord-tenant law rather than of any deposit section. Our guide to Connecticut landlord-tenant laws sets out the framework the deposit rules sit inside.

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